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Abstract
Since June 2013, we have seen unprecedented security breaches and
disclosures relating to American electronic surveillance. The nearly daily
drip, and occasional gush, of once-secret policy and operational information
makes it possible to analyze and understand National Security Agency
activities, including the organizations and processes inside and outside the
NSA that are supposed to safeguard American’s civil liberties as the agency
goes about its intelligence gathering business. Some have suggested that
what we have learned is that the NSA is running wild, lawlessly flouting
legal constraints on its behavior. This assessment is unfair. In fact, the
picture that emerges from both the Snowden and official disclosures is of an
agency committed to legal compliance, although both minor and major
noncompliance is nonetheless frequent. A large surveillance compliance
apparatus is currently staffed by hundreds of people in both the executive
and judicial branches. This infrastructure implements and enforces a
complex system of rules, not flawlessly but with real attention and care.
Where an authoritative lawgiver has announced rights or rights-protecting
procedures, the compliance apparatus works—to real, though not perfect
effect—to effectuate those rights and to follow those procedures.
Of course errors, small and large, occur. But even if perfect
compliance could be achieved, it is too paltry a goal. A good oversight
system needs its institutions not just to support and enforce compliance but
also to design good rules. Yet the offices that make up the NSA’s
compliance system are nearly entirely compliance offices, not policy offices;
they work to improve compliance with existing rules, but not to consider the
pros and cons of more individually-protective rules and try to increase
privacy or civil liberties where the cost of doing so is acceptable. The NSA
and the administration in which it sits have thought of civil liberties and
privacy only in compliance terms. That is, they have asked only “Can we
(legally) do X?” and not “Should we do X?” This preference for the can
question over the should question is part and parcel, I argue, of a
phenomenon I label “intelligence legalism,” whose three crucial and
simultaneous features are imposition of substantive rules given the status of
law rather than policy; some limited court enforcement of those rules; and
empowerment of lawyers. Intelligence legalism has been a useful corrective
to the lawlessness that characterized surveillance prior to intelligence
reform, in the late 1970s. But I argue that it gives systematically insufficient
weight to individual liberty, and that its relentless focus on rights, and
compliance, and law has obscured the absence of what should be an
additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy. More is needed;
additional attention should be directed both within the NSA and by its
overseers to surveillance policy, weighing the security gains from
surveillance against the privacy and civil liberties risks and costs. That
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attention will not be a panacea, but it can play a useful role in filling the civil
liberties gap intelligence legalism creates.
Part I first traces the roots of intelligence legalism to the last
generation of intelligence disclosures and resulting reform, in the late 1970s.
Part I then goes on to detail the ways in which intelligence legalism is
embedded in both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
and Executive Order 12,333, which govern American intelligence practices,
and why the result is a civil liberties gap. Part II discusses the ways in which
NSA’s compliance and oversight institutions likewise embody intelligence
legalism. I then move in Part III to some shortcomings of this system, and in
particular the ways in which the law and NSA’s compliance regulations and
infrastructure fall short of full civil liberties policy evaluation. In Part IV, I
examine some of the many reforms that have recently been proposed,
analyzing those that might fill that gap. In light of the existing institutional
arrangements, I sketch some thoughts on how they could do so most
effectively.
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Introduction

The story has now been told many times: On March 10, 2004,
President Bush’s White House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and chief of staff,
Andrew Card, went to the intensive care unit of the George Washington
University Hospital to try to persuade the ill Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, to sign off on continuing massive collection of Americans’ internet
metadata, a program started in October 2001. Deputy Attorney General
James Comey had refused to reauthorize the program; its most recent
authorization was scheduled to expire the next day. However, Comey got to
his boss first, and Ashcroft refused to sign. Pushed hard by Gonzales and
Card, and also by Vice President Cheney and his counsel, David Addington,
Comey and several of his Department of Justice colleagues stood their
ground and declined to ratify this domestic metadata collection based on the
President’s bare say-so. 1 This 2004 incident, the subject of much admiring
later press for the DOJ lawyers, 2 is part of what won Comey, a Republican,
his current appointment by President Obama to head the FBI. 3 This was a
group of lawyers who stood up to extreme pressure to tell their client—the
President—“no,” loudly (if in secret) and backed by threat of group
resignation. In a speech several years later to Intelligence Community
lawyers, Comey talked about the need for his listeners to “stand[] in front of
the freight train” when pushed by their clients to sign off on a collection
technique or target they believe to be unlawful. 4 The hospital bed incident,
live in audience members’ minds, gave Comey credibility.
But what did this incident actually accomplish? Recent disclosures
underscore that the dramatics were entirely out of scale to the actual, limited
result, which was a pause—not a stop—to the challenged collection. 5 What
1

For descriptions of the events, see, e.g., David Johnston & Scott Shane, Notes Detail
Pressure on Ashcroft Over Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A14; Barton Gellman,
Conflict Over Spying Led White House to Brink, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1; JAMES
BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE
EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 278-286 [hereinafter BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY];
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, ST-09-0002 WORKING DRAFT 42
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 NSA Draft IG Report], http://perma.cc/4E3N-HV7C.
2
See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2006),
http://perma.cc/X8TW-NANB (labeling the episode part of a “profile in courage”); Dan
Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST (May 16, 2007),
http://perma.cc/53D5-YYZ9.
3
See Associated Press, New Director James Comey Wants FBI ‘Independent of All Political
Forces,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://perma.cc/53G6-HH3B
(emphasizing that the 2004 event “symbolized a key piece of Comey’s past”).
4
James B. Comey, Intelligence Under Law, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 439, 442 (2005).
5
The most recent disclosures, made in response to an EFF FOIA request, were bundled
together and posted at the ODNI’s Tumblr (!), as Office of the Director of National
Intelligence Public Affairs Office, Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the NowDiscontinued NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Aug. 11, 2014), http://perma.cc/3LJ5-6GD3.
They evidence the government’s position that the FISA Court was obligated to approve the
internet metadata program without examination of its justification. Memorandum of Law
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had previously been an entirely executive initiative was pushed into the
FISA Court’s tent by a massive expansion of FISA’s pen register provision.
The authority under which the collection proceeded, four months later, was
new, but the program was the same. 6 Comey and his colleagues’ actions
were less standing down a freight train, and more the ordinary lawyers’ task
of assisting a client to make adjustments in order to accomplish operational
goals using different methods. This was a compliance improvement—and it
served rule-of-law values. But as far as the civil liberties impact, the change
was all but symbolic. 7
The mindset of Justice Department participants in the 2004 hospital
bed incident—a stance I call “intelligence legalism”—is the topic of this
Article. In her classic book, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials,
Judith Shklar defined legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds moral
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist
of duties and rights determined by rules.” 8 Legalism, Shklar observed, is the
central shared commitment of members of the legal profession. 9 It is what
underlies Tocqueville’s much older observations about lawyers:
If they prize freedom much, they generally value legality still
more. They are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrary power,
and provided the legislature undertakes of itself to deprive
men of their independence, they are not dissatisfied. 10
Intelligence legalism brings lawyers’ rule-of-law commitment into
the realm of national security and surveillance, where secrecy molds its
impact in a number of important ways. I see intelligence legalism’s three
crucial and simultaneous features as: imposition of substantive rules given
the status of law rather than policy, limited court enforcement of those rules,
and empowerment of lawyers. All three were in evidence in the 2004 drama.
Yet it is no coincidence that that incident did not catalyze a civil liberties
advance. In fact, this Article’s core argument is that intelligence legalism,
and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes 3, Docket PR/TT [redacted] (FISA Ct. 2004),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0028-0003.pdf [http://perma.cc/D5D42V9Y] (“First, once the Government certifies, as it has here, that the “information likely to
be obtained” is relevant to the investigation, the Court’s inquiry is properly at an end and the
Application should be approved. Congress made the Government’s certification on this
point dispositive.”).
6
2009 NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1.
7
For an even more skeptical view of the incident, see Marcy Wheeler, George W. Bush’s
False Heroes: The Real Story of a Secret Washington Sham, SALON (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://perma.cc/B8UP-ZAHF.
8
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1964)
9
Id. at 1–2, 8 (“Legalism is, above all, the operative outlook of the legal profession, both
bench and bar.”).
10
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250 (Barnes & Noble Publishing
2003) (1835), quoted in SHKLAR, LEGALISM, supra note 8, at 15.
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though useful, gives systematically insufficient weight to individual liberty.
Legalism legitimates liberty-infringing programs. And its relentless focus on
rights and compliance and law (with a definition of law that includes
regulation, executive orders, court orders, etc.) has obscured the absence of
what should be an additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy. That
additional focus is necessary, I argue, for optimal policy, which I take to be
the safeguarding of liberty where there is no cost, or acceptable cost, to
security.
The 2004 hospital-bed confrontation arose out of what has grown to
be a large surveillance compliance apparatus, currently staffed by hundreds
of people in both the executive and judicial branches. This infrastructure
implements and enforces a complex system of rules, not flawlessly but—at
least in recent years—with real attention and care. 11 Where an authoritative
lawgiver has announced rights or rights-protecting procedures, the
compliance apparatus works, to real, though not perfect effect, to effectuate
those rights and to follow those procedures. Of course errors, small and
large, occur. Even if perfect compliance could be achieved, however, it is
too paltry a goal. A good oversight system needs its institutions not just to
support and enforce compliance but to design good rules. But as will become
evident, the offices that make up the compliance system of the National
Security Agency (NSA) are nearly entirely compliance offices, not policy
offices; they work to improve compliance with existing rules, but not to
consider the pros and cons of more individually-protective rules and try to
increase privacy or civil liberties where the cost of doing so is acceptable.
The NSA and the Intelligence Community (IC) more generally have thought
of civil liberties and privacy only in compliance terms. That is, they have
asked only “Can we (legally) do X?” and not “Should we do X?” This
preference for can over should is part and parcel, I argue, of intelligence
legalism. More is needed. Additional attention should be directed both
within the NSA and by its overseers to the basic policy issues, weighing the
security gains from surveillance against the privacy and civil liberties risks
and costs. That attention will not be a panacea, but it can play a useful role in
filling the civil liberties gap intelligence legalism creates.
This Article rests on the unprecedented security breaches and
disclosures of the past months. These began on June 5, 2013, when the
British newspaper The Guardian ran the first story revealing information
from top secret documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden. 12 In the months since, a squadron of news outlets—the Guardian,
the Washington Post, the New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, CBC—
have between them published dozens of revelations about the NSA’s
11

Here I agree with Michael A. Cohen, Keith Alexander Needs a Hug, FOREIGN POLICY
(June 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/3SU9-7KJT. As he says, “One of the many ironies of the
Snowden story is that the modern legal infrastructure that regulates the actions of the NSA
is a significant liberal accomplishment.”
12
Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily,
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/7943-FPCS.
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activities. 13 And the federal government has offered unprecedented
responsive disclosures, 14 in part to put out its side of the story, and in part
because the leaks have eliminated the operational effectiveness of a good
many secrets. Government officials too have become newly willing to
discuss the operations of their offices. 15 With the nearly daily drip, and
occasional gush, of once-secret policy and operational information, it is now
possible to analyze and understand NSA activities, including the
organizations and processes inside and outside the NSA that are supposed to
safeguard American’s civil liberties as the agency goes about its spying
business. The paper leans heavily on the new disclosures, both official and
unofficial.
Part I first traces the roots of intelligence legalism to the last
generation of intelligence disclosures and resulting reform, in the late 1970s.
Then, it details the ways in which intelligence legalism is embedded in both
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and Executive
Order 12,333, which governs American intelligence practices, and why the
result is a civil liberties gap. Part II discusses the ways in which NSA’s
compliance and oversight institutions likewise embody intelligence legalism.
I then move in Part III to explain why intelligence legalism predictably
underweights civil liberties.
The Snowden disclosures and subsequent governmental policy
discussions have evidently led to a renewed interest in the “should” question,
in Congress and in the White House. The President himself responded to a
question about surveillance at a press conference: “just because we can do
something doesn’t mean we necessarily should.” 16 What will result is still

13

For a chronology of both the disclosures and the underlying events, see Timeline of NSA
Domestic Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/nsaspying/timeline (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
14
See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, IC ON THE RECORD, http://perma.cc/VV8CAPSS (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
15
This Article has benefitted greatly from this willingness, because I was able to conduct
interviews of numerous current and former government officials. These include telephone
interviews of: John DeLong, Dir. of Compliance, Nat’l Sec. Agency (Oct. 8, 2013)
[hereinafter DeLong Interview]; a senior IC attorney (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter IC
Attorney Interview]; Morton H. Halperin, former Special Assistant to the President (Oct. 14,
2014) [hereinafter Halperin Interview]; Alex Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Jan. 31, 2014)
[hereinafter Joel Interview]; Marty Lederman, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Lederman
Interview]; Nancy Libin, former Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Libin Interview]; Becky Richards, Civil Liberties and Privacy
Officer, Nat’l Sec. Agency (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Richards Interview]; and two White
House officials (Aug. 18 & 22, 2014) [hereinafter White House Official Interviews].
16
Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 20 News Conference (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://perma.cc/D5KF-GG8Q. See also, e.g., Lisa Monaco, Obama Administration:
Surveillance Policies under Review (Oct. 24, 2013), http://perma.cc/Q7SK-A3UJ (“We
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unclear. But Presidential Policy Directive 28, the most definite policy
document thus far, signals the possibility of some new, more libertyprotective, surveillance rules. PPD-28 also promises several reforms that
take quite a different approach. Rather than announcing new rules, the
relevant provisions specify an internal organizational strategy; they
designate actors and processes to facilitate fuller internal consideration of the
“should” question, down the line. Other extant reform proposals similarly
focus on organizational assignments and processes rather than complianceready rules. In light of the existing institutional arrangements, Part IV
sketches some thoughts on how this swathe of suggested reforms could be
most effective.
I. Intelligence Legalism
A. Origins
The June 2013 Guardian piece, which explained the NSA’s program
of wholesale collection of information about domestic phone calls (though
not the contents of the phone conversations themselves) had an analogue in
Seymour Hersh’s front-page 1974 New York Times exposure of massive
domestic surveillance by the CIA, in violation of rules limiting the agency to
foreign spying. 17 As in recent months, Hersh’s first leak-supported exposé
was followed by additional reporting and many official disclosures. 18 The
lead role in the following “year of intelligence,” 19 1975, was played by a
special Senate Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church, 20 whose seven

want to ensure we are collecting information because we need it and not just because we
can.”).
17
Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces,
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1974), available at
https://perma.cc/FC7V-4WWW
18
For official reports and disclosures, see, especially, ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION,
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (1975),
http://perma.cc/3UQH-GCUZ and many volumes of Church Committee Reports and
testimony, all available at Church Committee Reports, ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND
RESEARCH CTR., http://perma.cc/3T82-TC9R (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). The House
counterpart to the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, never issued its report, but the
full document was leaked to the Village Voice and also eventually published in Great
Britain. See Aaron Latham, The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read,
VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 16, 1976), at 69; How Kissinger, the White House, and the CIA
Obstructed the Investigation, VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 23, 1976), at 59; THE PIKE COMMITTEE,
CIA: THE PIKE REPORT (1977). For additional leaked disclosures, see, e.g., Seymour M.
Hersh, Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1974), available at http://perma.cc/UVJ6-6PMG; Seymour M. Hersh,
Aides Say Robert Kennedy Told of C.I.A. Castro Plot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1975), available
at http://perma.cc/Q6Y4-RVGB.
19
Editorial, The Year of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1975).
20
The Church Committee was known formally as the United States Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. See
S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
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volumes of reports and recommendations underlay much of the subsequent
reform—including the formation of the still-operative congressional
intelligence oversight committees, the passage of FISA, and the drafting of
executive orders governing the intelligence enterprise. 21
Reform took two basic approaches: disclosure and legalism. By
disclosure I do not mean the kind of leaks and declassifications we have seen
since 2013. The Church Committee, for example, did not chiefly urge a
system of direct public accountability. Rather, it recommended that agencies
running secret operations or intelligence surveillance make a long list of
disclosures both to Congressional oversight committees and within the
executive branch to the President and his staff, 22 and, as will be seen, to the
Attorney General. 23 The idea was to defeat “plausible denials” 24 and the
prior understanding with respect to both the Congress and the President that
“[i]t’s better for gentlemen not to know what’s going on.” 25 This would ease
the path of accountability to higher-up appointees, who might have better
judgment than those more deeply involved in surveillance, and to elected
officials if not to their constituencies.
Legalism was a second reform priority: reformers’ answer to the
starkly apparent disinterest of federal intelligence officials in legal
constraints on their activities. 26 Again looking to the Church Committee, the
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
COMMITTEE REPORT], http:// www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm.
21
See, e.g., Anne Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, in THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS 11–119 (William M. Leary, ed. 1984);
LOCH JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION (1985);
RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF REAGAN
(2014); KATHRYN OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POSTWATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI (1996); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr.,
The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight, 22 INTELLIGENCE AND
NAT’L SEC. 270 (2007); KATHERINE A. SCOTT, REINING IN THE STATE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND
CONGRESS IN THE VIETNAM AND WATERGATE ERAS (2013).
22
See, e.g., I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 431, 441, 442, 444, 448–49
(recommendation 15, 24, 28, 31, 37); II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at
293, 331 (recommendation 68).
23
See, e.g., II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 303, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315,
333 (recommendations 7(e), 13, 15, 17, 31, 35, 36, 70–74).
24
See S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, AN INTERIM REPORT OF
THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-465, at 11–12,
277–78 (1975) [hereinafter INTERIM CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT], http://perma.cc/6BWSA5XF.
25
LEROY ASHBY & ROD GRAMER, FIGHTING THE ODDS: THE LIFE OF SENATOR FRANK
CHURCH 471 (1994) (quoting Senator Leverett Saltonstall, as reported by Church); see also,
e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON TO OBAMA: A
STORY OF POOR CUSTODIANS 190 (2012).
26
I lean on the evidence cited on the treatment of this issue in PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE
BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 330–32, 416-19, 520–24, 534–38, 678–79, and Frederick A.O.
Schwarz, Jr., The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight, 22
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Committee in its report highlighted testimony of “the man who for ten years
headed FBI’s Intelligence Division” that “never once did I hear anybody,
including myself, raise the question: ‘Is this course of action which we have
agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral.’ We never gave any
thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally
pragmatic.” 27 Less dramatic, but perhaps even more telling, was the almost
uncomprehending testimony of NSA deputy director Benson Buffham,
facing questioning by Senator Walter Mondale, about a controversial NSA
program:
Mondale: “Were you concerned about its legality?”
Buffham: “Legality?”
Mondale: “Whether it was legal.”
Buffham: “In what sense? Whether that would have been a
legal thing to do?”
Mondale: “Yes.”
Buffham: “That particular aspect didn’t enter into the discussion.” 28
A 1976 book by four civil libertarians, including former NSC staffer Mort
Halperin, summarized the evidence in its title: The Lawless State: The
Crimes of the U. S. Intelligence Agencies. 29 Legalistic reforms were
designed to cure this documented disease.
Those reforms had three crucial and simultaneous features:
imposition of new substantive rules given the status of law rather than
policy; some limited court enforcement of those rules; and empowerment of
lawyers. The first two of these features have received abundant attention:
intelligence law was really born in the 1970s, 30 and has since blossomed. 31 It
now has a body of precedent sufficient to justify a treatise 32 and casebooks. 33

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 270 (2007); FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR. &
AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR
(2013).
27
II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 14 (statement of William Sullivan,
Nov. 1, 1975, pp. 92–93).
28
5 The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearing before the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong. 45 (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Hearings] (statement of
Benson Buffham, Deputy Director, NSA).
29
MORTON H. HALPERIN, JERRY J. BERMAN, ROBERT L. BOROSAGE, CHRISTINE M.
MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U. S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
(1976).
30
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (the “Keith case”).
31
See, e.g., Fred F. Manget, Another System of Oversight: Intelligence and the Rise of
Judicial Intervention, 39 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 43–50 (1996).
32
DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS &
PROSECUTIONS (2d ed. 2012); JAMES CARR & PATRICIA BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (2d ed. 2012).
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The augmentation of lawyers’ influence has gotten somewhat less
attention. 34 But a crucial aspect of intelligence legalism is that even more
than shifting power to the courts, it has shifted power to agency counsel and
the Department of Justice, instituting internal rules governing intelligence
operations and then deputizing the lawyers to see that those rules are
implemented. Government lawyers accordingly loom very large in the
reform documents of the late 1970s and thereafter. Over and over again, with
dozens of specifics, the Church Committee recommended amplifying the
authority and influence of lawyers within the executive branch. 35 The
Committee summarized at the start of its domestic intelligence
recommendations:
Who should be accountable within the Executive branch for
ensuring that intelligence agencies comply with the law and
for the investigation of alleged abuses by employees of those
agencies? . . . The Committee recommends that these
responsibilities fall initially upon the agency heads, their
general counsels and inspectors general, but ultimately upon
the Attorney General. 36
The specific domestic recommendations proposed to obligate the Attorney
General to review procedures, authorize operations, and conduct

33

E.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (5th ed. 2011); NORM ABRAMS,
ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT (4th ed. 2011); STEPHEN DYCUS, WILLIAM
C. BANKS, & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (2d ed. 2012); THOMAS M.
FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND SIMULATIONS (4th ed. 2011); GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2009); WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
(2d ed. 2008).
34
Two major exceptions are JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, POWER AND
CONSTRAINT], and JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY]. A few accounts of the work of the affected lawyers are available. See Laura
A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International
Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010); Dorian D. Greene, Ethical Dilemmas
Confronting Intelligence Agency Counsel, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 91, 108 (1994);
Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron Zelinsky, Practicing International Law in the Obama
Administration, 35 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Mary C. Lawton, Review and
Accountability in the United States Intelligence Community, OPTIMUM: J. PUB. SEC. MGMT.
101, 103 (Autumn 1993); JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND
WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 310-12
(1996); Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the “Historical Mists”: The
People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 437, 486 (2006); Afsheen John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes:
The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 201 (2008).
35
See, e.g., II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 308–09, 315–16, 332–37.
The Attorney General had a role, but a lesser one, in prior years. See, e.g., Appendix A.,
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673–75 (D.C. Cir. en banc, 1975).
36
II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 294.
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investigations. Even more notable, the Church Committee proposed a similar
role for the Attorney General with respect to foreign intelligence, far afield
from the Attorney General’s natural bailiwick of law enforcement and the
FBI (which is at least nominally part of the Department of Justice):
The Attorney General should be required to report the
President and to the intelligence oversight committee(s) of
Congress any intelligence activities which, in his opinion,
violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens or any
other provision of law and the actions he has taken in
response. Pursuant to the Committee’s Domestic
Recommendations, the Attorney General should be made
responsible for ensuring that intelligence activities do not
violate the Constitution or any other provision of law.
Additional specifics abounded. For example, the Committee recommended
that the Attorney General should advise the National Security Council and
should even chair a counterintelligence subcommittee. 37 And the Church
Committee’s appreciation for the potential role of lawyers did not stop with
the Attorney General. The reports included multiple recommendations, as
well, to enhance the stature of intelligence agency general counsels—making
their positions Senate confirmed, and requiring that they be consulted, have
access to more information, and have investigatory powers. 38
I have already mentioned the first reform that came from the Church
Committee report: Congress’s new permanent intelligence committees,
established in 1975 and 1976. 39 In addition, the Committee’s approach
underlay both FISA and Executive Order 12,333. I move now to those two
documents, and how legalism infuses them.
B. FISA
As originally enacted, FISA made two key innovations, both highly
legalizing. First, the Act subjected all domestic foreign intelligence
surveillance, and some such surveillance abroad, to analogues of domestic
warrant procedure. Surveillance of covered communications would have to
be authorized by a judicial officer—under FISA, a federal district judge
appointed by the Chief Justice to the FISA Court—after the government
demonstrated probable cause for the surveillance. 40 Second, FISA
37

I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 429, 431 (recommendation 6, 15).
I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 459–61; II CHURCH COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 20, at 294, 308, 332–35.
39
S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (1977).
40
The probable cause determination under FISA is not, as in ordinary search warrants or
Title III surveillance, probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but
something less—probable cause “that the target of the surveillance or search is a ‘foreign
power’ or an ‘agent of a foreign power,’ and that there is a nexus to the facility or place to
be surveilled or searched.” See 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 11:5. But the definition
38
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introduced the idea of “minimization procedures”—rules “designed to
protect, as far as reasonable, against the acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of nonpublic information which is not foreign intelligence
information” 41 that “concern[s] unconsenting United States persons.” 42 The
statutory “heart of minimization under FISA” 43 is the requirement that
surveillance and retention processes be “reasonably designed . . . to
minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States
persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information.” 44
The FISA warrant requirement was, of course, borrowed from
American criminal procedure. But the requirement of minimization
procedures is far less familiar—indeed, it deviates foundationally from nonintelligence Fourth Amendment doctrine. In American criminal procedure,
once the government gains lawful access to personal information, that
information can usually be used for any lawful purpose—including purposes
that would have invalidated the original access. So the government is
authorized to search airplane travelers without any individualized suspicion,
in order to be sure they are not, say, carrying a bomb that might bring down
a plane. 45 Now, suppose that during that search, the government finds
contraband that poses no aviation threat (drugs, perhaps, or a suspiciously
large amount of currency). The evidence may then be used in a subsequent
criminal prosecution, even though the very same search would have been
illegal if its original purpose had been criminal prosecution. Likewise, if a
police officer frisks a pedestrian in order to ameliorate the immediate threat
of a gun, and along the way “plainly” feels drugs, the drugs are admissible in
a criminal proceeding. 46 The foreign intelligence approach is different. 47 As
of “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power” generally require some kind of nefarious
conduct to justify a search targeting a U.S. citizen or resident. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), (b);
1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 8:2.
41
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
42
50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see also, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g); 50
U.S.C. § 1881a(e). In all things, FISA is complicated. For acquisitions under § 704,
minimization is required for dissemination but not for acquisition or retention.
43
1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 9:1.
44
50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). Compare § 1821(4)(A) with § 1861(g)(2)(A).
45
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (noting that the holding,
which invalidated a vehicle checkpoint program, “d[id] not affect the validity of . . .
searches at places like airports”); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless [sic] searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches . . . at airports.”).
46
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 377 (1993).
47
See Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1124–27 (2009) (laying out the differences between
“collection limits” and “use limits,” and setting out a variety of environments in which the
law implements the latter); BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 224 (2008)
(advocating for “relatively easy access” to intelligence information coupled with “stricter
rules” for “the use of that material.”). I should note that in his 2008 book (published prior to

126

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 6

in the administrative search context, the regulation of information
acquisition or collection is often very loose, with no requirement of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing in many situations. But, unlike with
respect to criminal prosecution uses of evidence obtained by administrative
search, the minimization procedures constrain what can happen next. 48
Prior to the Snowden leaks, only one of the FISA minimization
procedures—for information collected under a FISA Title I warrant 49—had
been declassified. Over the past months, the government has disclosed the
terms of several others: for targeted surveillance of foreigners abroad (under
FISA § 702), 50 the now-defunct internet metadata program (under FISA’s
pen register/trap-and-trace provision), 51 the ongoing telephony metadata

the FISA Amendments Act and the declassification of the various FISA minimization
orders), Wittes disagrees with my characterization of surveillance law. He sees that law,
rather, as “obsessed . . . with defining the circumstances of data acquisition,” and
disinterested in data use. Id. at 240.
48
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)
(providing for minimization procedures for FISA warrants involving electronic surveillance,
physical searches, and business record searches); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e); 50 U.S.C. §
1881b(b)(1)(D); 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(b)(4) (minimization procedures for targeted searches
abroad). The pull of this minimization approach is so strong that when the government’s
internet metadata program was brought under the umbrella of FISA’s pen/trap provisions,
minimization procedures were part of the package, even though this part of the Act make no
reference to minimization. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848; Memorandum Opinion, No. PR/TT
[Redacted], at 86 (FISA Ct. approx. June/July 2010) [hereinafter Bates 2010 PR/TT
Opinion],
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13111
[http://perma.cc/N85UUR5Q]; Opinion and Order, No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 43–44 (FISA Ct. July 2004)
[hereinafter
Kollar-Kotelly
2004
PR/TT
Opinion],
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13107 [http://perma.cc/8649-AM73].
49
The current NSA minimization rules for FISA Title I were approved by Attorney General
Janet Reno on July 1, 1997. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY ET AL, UNITED STATES SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE SP0018 Annex A, App. 1 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter USSID 18],
http://perma.cc/VD3M-JP7G (Standard Minimization Procedures for Electronic
Surveillance Conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA)). The date appears at the
end of the Appendix, after Section 8. The prior version of USSID 18 is dated July 27, 1993,
but was released much later—and it includes the same (1997) version of these Standard
Procedures, although they are differently titled. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY ET AL, UNITED
STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18 Annex A, App. 1 (July 27, 1993) [hereinafter
1993 USSID 18], http://perma.cc/6Q4A-J9UG. It may be that minimization procedures are
sometimes varied for different particular warrants. See USSID 18, supra, Annex A,
Procedures Implementing Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Section 3 (“In
some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems, and in those
instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices of the terms of the
court’s orders. In most cases, however, the court order will incorporate without any changes
the standardized minimization procedures set forth in Appendix I.”).
50
The minimization rules for FISA Section 702 are set forth in In re Proceedings Required
by § 702(i) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 2008 WL 9487946, No. Misc. 08-01, at
10 (FISA Ct. 2008), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0037-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9SJR-8GDG]. The minimization rules under Section 703 and 704 have not
been either leaked or released.
51
Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48; Kollar-Kotelly 2004 PR/TT Opinion, supra
note 48, at 43–44.
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program (under FISA’s business records provision), 52 as well as some
others. 53 All of these minimization procedures support the conclusion that
FISA’s minimization procedure requirement is legalizing in several
analytically distinct ways.
First, the procedures are themselves highly legalistic; they read like
statutes or regulations. Second, the minimization procedures frequently use
the strategy of designating a particular high official to make specified
decisions. 54 Implementation then forces subordinate personnel into using the

52

In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things From [Redacted], 2008 WL 9475145, No. BR 08-01 (FISA Ct. Jan. 2008),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0037-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9EJXJRF]. As this Article goes to press, the most recent of these orders declassified and
available is In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 14-125 (FISA Ct. Sept. 2014),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0067-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/E8883W3C]. An additional December 2014 order has not yet been declassified, but such
information
as
is
available
is
described
and
posted
at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14258 [http://perma.cc/EZJ7-2QFS].
53
In ongoing litigation before the FISA Court, the United States recently declassified four
different minimization procedures used by the FBI for physical and electronic searches
since 1995 and 1997, respectively, as well as 2006 amendments to them. See Standard
Physical Search Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter of the Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing Physical Search of a United States Person Agent of a
Foreign
Power,
No.
[omitted]
(FISA
Ct.
1995),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC0008-0044.pdf [http://perma.cc/JK8DFGPY]; Standard Physical Search Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter of the
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Physical Search of a Non-United
States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 1995),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0049.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6NWL-SABL]; Standard Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the
Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Electronic
Surveillance of a Non-United States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA
Ct.
1995),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0045.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z53S-6HHY]; Standard Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter
of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of
a United States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 1997),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0048.pdf [http://perma.cc/5SDSX34B]; Submission of Amendment to Standard Minimization Procedures, In re Amendment
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Standard Minimization Procedures for Electronic
Surveillance
and
Physical
Search,
No.
[omitted]
(FISA
Ct.
2006),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0046.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DSC7JUG].
54
For example, the 702 minimization procedures require: “A communication identified as a
domestic communication will be promptly destroyed upon recognition unless the Director
(or Acting Director) of NSA specifically determines, in writing,” that various prerequisites
for retention are satisfied. US ATT’Y GEN. ERIC HOLDER, EXHIBIT B: MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED § 5 (Oct. 31, 2011)
[hereinafter SECTION 702 NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES], https://perma.cc/8LBMCRRZ.
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legalistic method of reasoned elaboration, 55 as they explain why the outcome
they favor should be adopted by the official authorized to decide. As Mary
Lawton, the Department of Justice lawyer who helped to draft FISA and was
for several decades the most influential bureaucrat of intelligence legalism, 56
explained in 1993, “[i]mplicit in these requirements are certain formidable
bureaucratic constraints: articulation, consideration, consensus and personal
accountability,” which together slow down and rationalize actions
proposed. 57 Both “articulation” and “consideration” are characteristic of
legalized decisions. Third, the procedures empower lawyers: they must be
approved by the Attorney General, and therefore first by DOJ lawyers, prior
to being offered to the FISA Court for its signoff. 58 Fourth, once approved,
the procedures acquire the privileged status of federal court orders.
Obedience becomes a compliance, rather than a policy, task for the NSA,
subject to requirements of court disclosure and correction. 59 So if NSA
fails—particularly if it fails systematically—the court might impose various
consequences ranging from embarrassment for particular lawyers to
withdrawing approval for a whole NSA program. 60 It is evident that these
consequences are only loosely coupled with the substantive importance of
the disregarded minimization feature; the FISA court has sometimes scolded

55

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey

eds., 1994).
56
See Piette & Radack, supra note 34, at 449; Ronald Sullivan, Mary C. Lawton, 58: U.S.
(Oct.
30,
1993),
Official
Shaped
Intelligence
Policies,
N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/30/obituaries/mary-c-lawton-58-us-official-shapedintelligence-policies.html; MCGEE & DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE, supra note 34.
57
Mary Lawton, Review and Accountability in the United States Intelligence Community,
OPTIMUM, Aug. 1993, p. 101. I agree with Lawton that these dynamics taken together are
essentially bureaucratic, in addition to being legalistic; Lawton wrote that in the intelligence
arena as in so many other policy spaces, “[b]ureaucracy itself is the prime control
mechanism.” Id.
58
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (Title I FISA warrant for electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. §
1821(4) (Title III FISA warrant for physical search); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (Title V business
record/tangible things search); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (Title VII non-U.S. person abroad); 50
U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(d) (Title VII U.S. person abroad probable cause order); 50 U.S.C. §
1881c(b)(4) (same, surveillance abroad).
59
See FISA Court Rule 13, Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of NonCompliance, http://perma.cc/9DKM-KQ9A (“(b) Disclosure of Non-Compliance. If the
government discovers that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been
implemented in a manner that did not comply with the Court’s authorization or approval or
with applicable law, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to
whom the submission was made of . . . the facts and circumstances relevant to the noncompliance.”).
60
See, e.g., In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 18
(FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-00110005.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PS6-5UGK] (suspending the government’s ability to access
telephony metadata collected pursuant its Section 215 authority except for the purpose of
“ensuring data integrity and compliance with the Court’s orders,” and prohibiting the
government from accessing any telephony metadata for the purpose of obtaining foreign
intelligence unless the government requests such access from the Court on a case-by-case
basis).
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the government for noncompliance with minimization orders whose features
it agrees to relax in the very same opinion. 61
Post-September 11 amendments to and interpretations of FISA have
vastly reduced the warrant-style individuation required for FISA-authorized
surveillance. Under the FISA Amendments Act, the FISA Court now signs
off on a massive program of targeted surveillance of foreigners—including
when their communication is with an American—and on some smaller
amount of targeted surveillance of U.S. persons abroad, without adjudicating
the existence of probable cause for the targets. 62 And we now know that at
least two bulk metadata programs—one examining a broad array of domestic
internet communications, and the other focusing on an even larger share of
domestic phone calls—have been deemed authorized by FISA without
individuated suspicion of any party to the communications. Much of FISA
surveillance, 63 that is, no longer resembles ordinary domestic criminal
practice. Nonetheless the basic legalizing structure has remained intact:
lawyers prepare, and judges approve, the proposed surveillance, and it is
accompanied by court-ratified minimization procedures given the force of
law.
C. Executive Order 12,333
Executive Order 12,333 (invariably referred to orally as, simply,
“twelve triple three”) is the “foundational” federal surveillance authority,
applicable to all activities not otherwise regulated that touch or might touch
U.S. person information. 64 Executive Order 12,333 has been amended three
times since President Reagan issued it first in 1981, most recently and
significantly in 2008, but it has retained its basic character. 65 As the
61

In 2009, for example, Judge Reggie B. Walton allowed the government to continue using
“defeat lists” in its handling of PR/TT metadata, even though those defeat lists “deviated, at
least in part,” from court-approved procedures. See Supplemental Order, No. PR/TT
[Redacted], at 2 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NSDC-0013-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/9DFW-PJAB]. And in 2012, Judge Bates authorized
“upstream” collection of internet communications under Section 702, even though he had
previously held such collection to violate court orders. See Memorandum Opinion, No.
PR/TT [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC0057-0008.pdf [http://perma.cc/SKU6-QYAS].
62
FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 2436 Stat. 122 (2008); 50 U.S.C. §
1881a(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(D); 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(b)(4) (minimization procedures
for targeted searches abroad).
63
For the terms of the internet metadata program, see Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra
note 48; Kollar-Kotelly 2004 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48, at 43–44. For the terms of the
telephony metadata program, see the minimization procedures cited supra note 52.
64
See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES,
OVERSIGHT AND PARTNERSHIPS 2 (August 9, 2013), http://perma.cc/968K-YRXR.
65
See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended by Exec. Order
No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53594
(Aug. 27, 2004); and Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008). For
Exec. Order No. 12,333’s predecessors, see Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703
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organizing document for the nation’s intelligence operations, it applies to the
entire Intelligence Community (IC). 66 Individual IC elements then
implement it via more focused guidelines, which are required to be signed
by the Attorney General. 67 For the wide swathes of foreign intelligence
surveillance that are not covered by FISA, regulation under Executive Order
12,333 occurs without judicial involvement. That is, where FISA does not
apply, it is 12,333 that limits the collection, retention, use, and dissemination
of U.S. person information, no matter what the method of surveillance—
even if, for example, the communications are acquired from some foreign
partner agency. The Executive Order explains that its “general principles . . .
in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve
the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and
protection of individual interests.” 68 For surveillance, its basic approach is
two-fold: it insists on in-advance fully vetted written procedures, and it
authorizes specific surveillance without court approval only if the Attorney
General approves.
On the first point, surveillance, retention, use, and dissemination
procedures must be approved in advance at a very high level within the
administration; the Executive Order does not use the word “minimization”
but the idea is the same. Such procedures are generally developed by the IC
element involved, in consultation (in the most recent version) with the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, and then must be approved by the
Attorney General. 69 Attorney General-approved procedures are required for:
•
•
•

Coordination of counterintelligence activities and the clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence inside the United States. 70
Intelligence collection, retention, and dissemination concerning
U.S. persons. 71
Intelligence collection within the U.S. or directed against U.S.
persons abroad. 72

(Feb. 18, 1976) (Ford administration); Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Rev. 3674 (Jan. 24,
1978) (Carter administration).
66
Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 3.5(h) (listing the many agencies, departments, and offices that
comprise the “Intelligence Community”).
67
Id. § 3.2.
68
Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.2.
69
See Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.3 (procedures governing collection, retention,
dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons); § 2.4 (procedures governing
collection within the U.S. or directed against U.S. persons abroad); § 2.9 (procedures
governing IC element personnel surreptitious participation in an organization in the U.S.);
§ 3.2 (everything else in Part 2); see also § 2.3(j) (procedures on dissemination of SIGINT
are to be developed by the DNI, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense; AG approval
is required).
70
Id. § 1.3(b)(20).
71
Id. § 2.3 (developed by IC element, consultation with DNI).
72
Id. § 2.4 (developed by IC element, consultation with DNI).

2015 / Intelligence Legalism and the NSA’s Civil Liberties Gaps
•
•

131

How information possessed by all the executive agencies is
provided to or accessed by the IC, and how that information may
be used or shared. 73
Dissemination of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). 74

Evidently the Attorney General’s disapproval on “constitutional or other
legal grounds” is final. But the Attorney General is authorized to disapprove
for other, non-legal reasons as well: “[W]here the element head or
department head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreements
on other than constitutional or other legal grounds, the Attorney General, the
head of department concerned, or the Director shall refer the matter to the
NSC [National Security Council].” 75
What has emerged from this E.O. 12,333 process is a number of ICelement-specific “AG Guidelines.” Once issued, these are bureaucratically
difficult to change. 76 For the NSA, as part of the Department of Defense, the
Executive Order 12,333 Attorney General guidelines were signed in 1982 as
part of Department of Defense Directive 5240.1-R, and have not since been
modified. 77 These are joined by other similarly amendment-resistant
documents. At the NSA, such documents include a (now mostly
de)classified annex governing NSA’s role and procedures 78 ; another
document titled U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (generally referred to
as USSID 18), which in turn has its own (de)classified annex and was
apparently last updated in 2011 79 ; and a formal policy document most
recently issued in 2004, with yet another (de)classified annex. 80
Substantively, these documents together function like FISA minimization
procedures, although they are laxer in several ways. Procedurally, however,
they are very different. For FISA minimization, written justifications and
73

Id. § 1.3(a)(2).
Id. § 2.3(j) (developed by DNI, in coordination with the Defense Secretary).
75
Id. § 3.2.
76
For example, the AG Guidelines on Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that
Affect United States Persons were signed in 1982. See DEP’T OF DEF., PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED
STATES PERSONS (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec. 1982) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R],
http://perma.cc/X9QM-JR8E. For an account of the contentious process of reissuing one set
of AG Guidelines, governing the National Counter-Terrorism Center, see Margo Schlanger,
Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 53, 88–92 (2014), and sources cited.
77
See DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76.
78
See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & CENT. SEC. SERV., CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE PROCEDURES UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 9 (ID 3199129, Mar. 11, 2004),
available at https://perma.cc/EF7J-99CA.
79
See USSID 18, supra note 49. The 1993 version is also available: 1993 USSID 18, supra
note 49, at 26, along with its declassified Annex A, at 51–62.
80
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & CENT. SEC. SERV., NSA/CSS POLICY 1–23 (Mar. 11, 2004),
https://perma.cc/4XSA-J2GX. The classified annex was apparently signed by Deputy
Secretary of Defense William R. Taft and Attorney General Edwin Meese in April and May
1988, respectively. See id. at A-13.
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explanations of each program are filed with the FISA Court and undergird
each eventual court approval. Any change in the underlying processes might
be material to the Court’s approval, and therefore needs to be explained.81
For E.O. 12,333 processes, the AG Guidelines are more freestanding; there
is no subsequent formal implementation check. Thus even apart from the
greater leeway allowed by the AG Guidelines, compared to FISA-approved
minimization procedures, the result is substantially more operational
freedom under 12,333 than under FISA.
In addition to its requirements of Attorney General-approved
processes, Executive Order 12,333 “delegate[s]” to the Attorney General the
authority “to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United
States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a
warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes,” if
the Attorney General finds “probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 82 Under
this provision, the Attorney General operates essentially like a warrantgranting magistrate, with operational control of the decision to initiate
surveillance. (This requirement has been largely superseded by FISA Title
VII, but it remains operative in some rare situations, and also in
emergencies. 83) While there is no judicial involvement, the process is very
similar to a judicial one; the same lawyers who prepare FISA applications
prepare a similar application for the Attorney General to approve (or
reject). 84
As a whole, then, notwithstanding the entire absence of court
involvement, E.O. 12,333 is a key source of intelligence legalism. It is worth
noting, too, that its text was one of the sites around which intelligence
legalism was hotly contested. One of the Order’s drafters, Richard Willard,
recounted a few years later that when he arrived at the Department of Justice
early in the Reagan administration, as Attorney General Smith’s Counsel for
Intelligence Policy, “holdover [career] officials in the intelligence
81

See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 09-06, at 4 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0013-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/2295SDDT] (“First, the government disclosed in its filings in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED]
that NSA has generally failed to adhere to the special dissemination restrictions originally
proposed by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the
collection of the PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court’s orders as binding on
NSA.”). See id. at 2 (“As the government has acknowledged, its practices with regard to the
creation and use of defeat lists for selectors deviated, at least in part, from the procedures
governing the handling of PRITT metadata. It is important to note that the procedures at
issue were devised by the government and incorporated into the Court’s orders as binding
upon the NSA at the government’s suggestion. Had the government initially proposed
procedures permitting defeat list practices such as those described in the [redacted]
Response and the [redacted] Declaration, the Court likely would have found them
reasonable and would have incorporated such procedures in its orders.”).
82
Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.5.
83
IC Attorney Interview, supra note 15.
84
Id.
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community were busily drafting a new Executive order on intelligence
activities that would virtually eliminate the legal oversight role of the
Attorney General,” because of the “enormous pent-up hostility in the
intelligence community toward lawyers and legalistic restrictions.” 85 This
“attitude was not an invention of the Republican political appointees—who
at that time were not yet that numerous—but permeated the career
service.” 86 It was his assignment, he explained, to mold Executive Order
12,333 into something more “balanced” 87 —that is, more pro-lawyer. He
succeeded; E.O. 12,333 inserted the Attorney General deep into intelligence
policy and even operations. This intervention marked a sharp change.
Willard notes that in his time at the department,
[t]he Attorney General was not a full member of the cabinetlevel group that considered these [foreign intelligence and
policy] matters but was only ‘invited’ to attend. It is my
understanding that Attorney General Meese was later made a
member of the group, but that even then some effort was
made to insist that he was a member in his personal capacity
and not as Attorney General. . . . As a consequence of the
Attorney General’s uncertain status in the process, his
subordinates were generally excluded from working groups
and subcabinet-level deliberations. 88
In total, while the tendency is more extreme for FISA, each of the two
foundational documents for foreign intelligence surveillance, FISA and
Executive Order 12,333, has moved surveillance programs in legalistic
directions, emphasizing rules and empowering lawyers.
The political theories underlying both of the 1970s intelligence
reform strategies, disclosure and legalism, are obvious: disclosure serves
accountability, and legalism serves the rule of law. But neither one directly
seeks the appropriate balance between liberty and surveillance, however
appropriateness is evaluated. One would therefore expect institutional
arrangements premised on these two theories to serve disclosure and
legalism, but to fail to prioritize, or even to weigh, individual’s liberty
interests when they are in tension with surveillance goals. This produces
what I call the civil liberties gap. Part II explores whether this gap exists in
practice, describing the NSA’s existing compliance and oversight systems in
some detail.
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Richard K. Willard, Law and the National Security Decision-Making Process in the
Reagan Administration, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (1988).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Willard, supra note 86, at 131–32.
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II. The NSA’s Existing Compliance and Oversight Ecosystem
The NSA’s General Counsel, Rajesh De, has described the NSA’s
total oversight apparatus as extremely thorough. “It is evident to me,” De
said in a speech in early 2013, “that I am the general counsel for one of the
most highly regulated entities in the world.” 89 With more exasperation,
former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker has argued that the whole
system—an “army of second-guessers”—is too constraining:
The judges of the FISA court have cleared law clerks who
surely see themselves as counterweights to the government’s
lawyers. The government’s lawyers themselves come not
from the intelligence community but from a Justice
Department office that sees itself as a check on the
intelligence community and feels obligated to give the FISA
court facts and arguments that it would not offer in an
adversary hearing. There may be a dozen offices that think
their job is to act as a check on the intelligence community’s
use of FISA: inspectors general, technical compliance
officers, general counsel, intelligence community staffers,
and more. 90
Baker’s estimated dozen offices was, in fact, the precise number:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

NSA Office of the Director of Compliance
NSA Office of the General Counsel
NSA Office of the Inspector General
DOJ National Security Division, Office of Intelligence
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
Intelligence Community Office of the Inspector General
ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Office
ODNI Office of the General Counsel
ODNI Mission Integration Division (Office of the Deputy
Director for Intelligence Integration)
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, Intelligence Oversight
Board
FISA Court and FISA Court of Review
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

Add to that the newest office—NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Office.

89

Rajesh De, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Agency, Address at Georgetown Law School (Feb.
27, 2013), http://perma.cc/RP2N-9DB8.
90
Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance
Programs: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 29, 2013)
(testimony of Stewart Baker, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP), http://perma.cc/T4Z3SQ5W.
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In total, more than a few hundred people spend all or a substantial
part of their work weeks on NSA compliance and oversight. This enormous
staffing commitment itself demonstrates real commitment to abiding by the
FISA and 12,333 rules. (In other topic areas, one might suspect that the
commitment is to being seen to abide by the rules—but the IC’s secrecy
undercuts that cynical interpretation.) Nonetheless, inevitably, the agency is
far from perfectly compliant. On occasion, compliance errors have been
extremely widespread: In 2009, the government disclosed a series of
significant compliance failures to the FISA Court affecting both the internet
and telephony metadata programs. These included systemic failures to
comply with the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, by use of lessstrictly vetted alert lists and seed accounts; unauthorized sharing of
unminimized query results with other agency personnel; and collection of
fields of metadata beyond what was allowed by court order on nearly all the
internet metadata records. 91 In addition, in 2011, the government reported
that the “upstream” methods it was using to surveil American internet
communications abroad were incapable of confining NSA access to only
communications that met the standard for collection. 92 These were extremely
significant failures, and they prompted some moderately robust responses—
creation of the current NSA compliance office, 93 augmentation of the Justice
Department oversight role, 94 and some stern (though for years secret)
lectures by the FISA Court judges. 95

91

NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, BUSINESS RECORDS FISA NSA REVIEW 8, 16 (June 25, 2009)
(Section 215 telephony metadata), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC0014-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/JBB9-R569]; NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PEN REGISTER/TRAP
TRACE
FISA
NSA
REVIEW
(date
redacted),
AND
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0065-0002.pdf [http://perma.cc/336Q6942].
92
Memorandum Opinion, No. [Redacted], at 5 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0057-0002.pdf
[http://perma.cc/US7V-7S6B].
93
DeLong interview, supra note 15.
94
Compare In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 07-16, § 3(E) (FISA Ct. Oct.
18,
2007),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0036-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CY7M-UF5K] (requiring the Justice Department to review a sample of the
NSA’s justifications for querying archived data at least once every ninety days), and In re
Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of
Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 08-08 § 3(E) (FISA Ct. Aug. 19, 2008),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0040-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BNU9-Q879] (same, every sixty days), with In re Application of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
From [Redacted], BR 09-15, § 3(M), (N) (FISA Ct. Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0016-0002.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST3KTWSY] (requiring the NSA’s OGC to consult with NSD on all significant legal opinions
that relate to authorizations by the FISA court), and In re Application of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted],
BR
09-19,
§
3(O),
(P),
(Q),
(R)
(FISA
Ct.
Dec.
16,
2009),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0053-0006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8JWM-AY34] (requiring the NSA’s OGC to provide NSD with copies of
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It is surely reasonable to expect better than these low points. But it
would be unrealistic to demand either perfect compliance or perfect
detection of noncompliance. Both are unattainable for an organization as
complex as the NSA, governed by rulesets as complex as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Executive Order 12,333, and their related
procedural documents. Error, after all, has many causes. Sometimes the rules
are misunderstood or miscommunicated. 96 Sometimes someone who
understands the rules makes a mistake—enters a typo, for example, 97 or
seeks approval later than the rules require. 98 Sometimes, one can imagine,
systems fail—a computer algorithm that is supposed to distinguish among
people with different statuses might miscategorize a new status, for example.
And sometimes people try to defeat the rules. 99 In a system as massive and

all formal briefing and/or training materials used to brief and train NSA personnel in regard
to the authorizations granted by the order).
95
See, e.g., In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 09-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25,
2009),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0015-0002.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S44V-72TP] (stating that “[t]he Court is deeply troubled” by compliance
failures and ordering representatives of the NSA and NSD to appear before the court to
explain); Order, No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 6 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0029-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7RGY-FML8] (“The Court is gravely concerned . . . that NSA analysts,
cleared and otherwise, have generally not adhered to the dissemination restrictions proposed
by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the collection of the
PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court’s orders in this matter [redacted] as
binding on NSA.”); In re Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at
5–8 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-00110005.pdf [http://perma.cc/KFT2-WZME] (stating that the government’s justification for its
non-compliance with the FISA Court’s orders “strain[ed] credulity” and admonishing the
government for its systemic compliance failures and “material misrepresentations” to the
Court).
96
See, e.g., Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48, at 10–11 (reporting unauthorized
collection of data that “did not result from technical difficulty or malfunction, but rather
from a failure of ‘those NSA officials who understood in detail the requirements of the . . .
[authorization] . . . to communication those requirements effectively to the [redacted] who
were directly responsible’ for the implementation”).
97
The Washington Post has reported that a “quality assurance” document (apparently not
yet made public) says that in 2008, a typo in a program substituting the U.S. area code 202
for the international code 20-2 led to the collection of metadata about a “large number” of
calls placed from Washington, D.C., instead of Cairo, Egypt. Barton Gellman, NSA Broke
Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013,
http://perma.cc/9YNY-DGZ5. For more routine typo errors, see, e.g., SID Oversight &
Compliance, NSAW SID Intelligence Oversight (IO) Quarterly Report – First Quarter
Calendar Year 2012 (1 January – 31 March 2012) Executive Summary, (May 3, 2012),
http://perma.cc/59GV-GD6D.
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See ATT’Y GEN. & DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF
COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACT 24 (Aug. 2013), http://perma.cc/9PG9ST3T (describing reporting delays).
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See Letter from George Ellard, Inspector General, National Security Agency to Sen.
Charles E. Grassley, Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 11, 2013),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171424593/NSA-Surveillance-LOVEINT.
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complicated as the NSA’s signals intelligence program, even an extremely
low rate of error can add up. 100 (Although because most of the information
collected does not involve persons in the U.S. or Americans abroad, these
errors frequently do not violate anyone’s constitutional rights, under current
doctrine.) Of course, each type of error can be reduced. But compliance
errors are often hydraulic—pushing out errors in one place is likely to
introduce at least some errors in another place. 101 The goal, then, is not zero
errors, but rather, as the NSA’s Director of Compliance puts it, to “assure
compliance at a reasonable level.” 102 NSA has not always achieved that
goal—but it musters substantial effort to do so.
A. NSA Offices
Four offices at the NSA address civil liberties and privacy issues: the
Office of the Director of Compliance, the Civil Liberties and Privacy Office,
the Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of General Counsel. All
but the second are compliance offices; the new civil liberties office is a
policy development shop. I discuss them in turn.
1. NSA Compliance Office
The NSA has a central compliance office, the Office of the Director
of Compliance, whose current (and founding) head, John DeLong, reports to
the NSA’s director. The compliance office grew out of several serious
compliance problems exposed to the FISA Court in 2009, 103 and gained its
statutory authority in 2010. It is assigned “responsib[ility] for the programs
of compliance over mission activities.” 104 Although the office is mentioned
specifically only in some of the FISA minimization procedures, it seems to
deal comprehensively not just with FISA-court supervised intelligence, but
100

Consider the estimate that the NSA collects about 100 billion pieces of information from
the internet monthly. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The
NSA’s Secret Tool to Track Global Surveillance Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013),
http://perma.cc/HL5N-FV3S. The oft-cited “six sigma” business goal of no more than 3.4
defective parts per million, see, e.g., MIKEL HARRY & RICHARD SCHROEDER, SIX SIGMA:
THE BREAKTHROUGH MANAGEMENT STRATEGY REVOLUTIONIZING THE WORLD’S TOP
CORPORATIONS (2000), would mean 340,000 monthly errors in that collection.
101
For example, if a system guards against typos by offering only normalized inputs, via a
pull-down menu, then that may greatly reduce the number of typing errors, but it
simultaneously creates the opportunity for a more significant error if whoever inputs the
menu options makes a mistake.
102
Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare Podcast Episode #53: Inside NSA, Part II – Wherein We
Interview the Agency’s Chief of Compliance, John DeLong, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://perma.cc/PP7E-928Y.
103
See text accompanying supra note 91.
104
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010, 50 U.S.C. § 3602(3) (“There is a Director of
Compliance of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the Director of the
National Security Agency and who shall be responsible for the programs of compliance over
mission activities of the National Security Agency.”).
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with all the procedures that are approved by the Attorney General under
Executive Order 12,333—which means all the NSA’s collection activities,
as well as the retention, analysis, and dissemination of any U.S. person
information. The NSA’s compliance office is a member of the bureaucratic
species I have labeled “Offices of Goodness”—it is an office within an
operational agency that is: advisory rather than operational; tasked with
furthering a particular value not otherwise primary for the agency in which it
sits; and internal and dependent on its agency. 105 (I label that value with the
placeholder, “Goodness,” because the creator of the office obviously
believes the particular value to be good.) For the NSA compliance office, the
value that infuses its existence is, well, compliance: its mission is to
facilitate NSA’s compliance with constraints imposed upon the agency,
detecting noncompliance consistently and rapidly. 106
The compliance office has a staff of about 30. A much larger
contingent of compliance staff—about another 270 employees—work within
NSA’s various operational units. The chain of command for these employees
runs up through the heads of their units. But they report secondarily, via “as
thick a dotted line as can be imagined,” to the central compliance office. 107
The office was revamped and empowered in 2009, when many significant
compliance problems came to light in FISA proceedings. Before that, there
were fewer than 100 compliance staff throughout the NSA, including an
Office of Oversight and Compliance housed deeper in the organizational
chart, within the NSA’s Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Currently, the
compliance staff’s tasks include developing procedures; working with
engineers to hardwire the relevant requirements into computer systems;
training; certifying procedures to the FISA Court; conducting both routine
and broad compliance monitoring and reviews; and reviewing incidents of
non-compliance. Thus NSA compliance staff work in an iterative way on
non-compliance prevention, detection, and response, using both proactive
and reactive strategies. DeLong explains that his office’s current incarnation
is modeled after corporate compliance offices, which frequently (particularly
since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) are placed outside the general
counsel’s office and with an office head who reports to the CEO. The work,
DeLong says, is “organized functionally—for example, collecting, targeting,
querying, sharing. That makes it easier to build compliance systems; it’s
good if those are somewhat uniform across activities. We’re not stove-piped
by authority, except for Section 215 [the telephony metadata program].” 108
105

Schlanger, Offices of Goodness, supra note 76.
Email from John DeLong to author (Sept. 6, 2014) (on file with author).
107
DeLong Interview, supra note 15.
108
Id. For other sources in which DeLong has described his office, see Aliya Sternstein, At
NSA, Computers Sometimes Make the Policy Calls, NEXTGOV (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://perma.cc/7248-KKXC; Aliya Sternstein, Compliance with Wiretap Law is
Transparent, NSA Says, NEXTGOV (Aug. 29, 2012), http://perma.cc/426M-VW34; Aliya
Sternstein, Eyes on Spies, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 1, 2012) http://perma.cc/7LEF-SJ7X; Aliya
Sternstein, Meet the NSA Officer Charged With Balancing Surveillance and Civil Liberties,
NEXTGOV (Oct. 15, 2012), http://perma.cc/G5TN-UAE4; Julia Ziegler, NSA Clears Up
Misconceptions About Compliance, FED. NEWS RADIO (Nov. 8, 2012),
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The infrastructure that compliance staff use to accomplish this work
is quite comprehensive. For example, under the applicable minimization
rules, the NSA’s systems used for FISA surveillance are built to create an
audit trail. Database queries create a record that can later be reviewed to
ensure that the person who provided the query had the right credentials and
the required training, that the query itself met applicable rules, and so on.
Compliance personnel are responsible for conducting periodic reviews that
are thus enabled. Non-compliant uses are categorized, analyzed, and
reported, 109 and sometimes new systematic safeguards are put in place as a
result. 110
Incident review systems supplement the periodic reviews. All NSA
personnel are required to report any compliance mistakes or episodes of
noncompliance with relevant court orders or other rules. 111 These reports
then are distributed to the compliance office, as well as to the NSA Office of
General Counsel (OGC) and NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

http://perma.cc/PY6Y-B5NM; John M. DeLong, For Agencies, the Intersection of
Technology and Compliance Is Complex, FEDTECH (Feb. 4, 2013), http://perma.cc/8BYMC7TC; Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare Podcast Episode #53: Inside NSA, Part II – Wherein We
Interview the Agency’s Chief of Compliance, John DeLong, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://perma.cc/A3GF-AMZK; NSA Compliance Director on Privacy Regulations, DEFENSE
NEWS,
http://www.defensenews.com/VideoNetwork/2150661626001/NSA-ComplianceDirector-on-Privacy-Regulations (last visited Aug. 16, 2014); NSA Compliance Director on
NEWS,
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DEFENSE
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For a still-classified example, see NSA Report on Privacy Violations in the First Quarter
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Assessment of Compliance with FISA Amendments Act Procedures and Guidelines,
Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (March 2009)
(reporting period: Sept. 4, 2008–Nov. 30, 2008), https://perma.cc/HY5F-6PB9; Semiannual
Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence (Dec. 2009) (reporting period: Dec. 1, 2008–May 31,
2009), https://perma.cc/8LHZ-XMVE; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with
Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director Of National
Intelligence (May 2010) (reporting period: June 1, 2009–Nov. 30, 2009),
https://perma.cc/QNN7-DAHD; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures
and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2013)
(reporting period: June 1, 2012–Nov. 2012), http://perma.cc/RS3R-FKQV.
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111
DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76, at C15.3.1.1 (“Each employee shall report any
questionable activity to the General Counsel or Inspector General for the DoD intelligence
component concerned, or to the General Counsel, DoD, or ATSD(IO).”); id. at C15.2.1
(“The term ‘questionable activity’ . . . refers to any conduct that constitutes, or is related to,
an intelligence activity that may violate the law, any Executive order or Presidential
directive, including E.O. 12,333 . . . or applicable DoD policy, including this Regulation.”).
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For the 702 program, NSA OGC also forwards each incident report to the
Department of Justice and to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). 112 All FISA compliance errors are to be disclosed to
the FISA judge who approved the relevant order. 113 For non-FISA matters,
where the NSA OGC “ha[s] reason to believe” that the incident “may be
unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive,” further
reports go, via ODNI, to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. 114
Each of these incidents requires follow up within NSA: compliance staff
share the obligation to follow up with the Office of the Inspector General.
Overall, the compliance office performs a blend of compliance
oversight and what DeLong calls “rules coaching”:
A compliance officer and the compliance organization is
there really as more of a rules coach, if you will . . . not
deciding what the rules are—that’s the lawyers and policy
folks—not building technology, not doing operations, but
getting in there, rolling our sleeves up, right? Really kind of
on the field . . . not as a referee, not . . . up in the stands, but
as . . . a rules coach. 115
2. NSA Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy
Within a few weeks of the Snowden disclosures, the President
announced that the NSA would “put in place a full-time civil liberties and
privacy officer.” 116 This particular bureaucratic structure is one that has
developed over the past decade, during which several IC components and
agencies that include such components—ODNI, CIA, DoD, DHS, DOJ, and
others—have added Privacy and Civil Liberties Offices. 117 Apparently the
112
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introduction of a civil liberties and privacy officer was not forced upon the
NSA; officials there sponsored and embraced the idea. 118 The job
announcement went up in September 2013, 119 and the new NSA Civil
Liberties and Privacy Officer, Rebecca Richards, began work four months
later. 120
The role was clearly designed to be a policy job—helping to develop
the rules, not merely promoting compliance with them. The job posting
included the following specific duties:
b. As the senior architect for CL/P [civil liberties/privacy],
ensure that protections are addressed as part of all internal
strategic decision processes related to the agency’s
operations, key relationships, tradecraft, technologies,
resources or policies. . . .
e. Manage CL/P policy, and advise on related assessment and
compliance programs. . . .
h. Provide CL/P reviews and assessments as required of the
NSA support to the U.S. Cyber Command. 121
As one might expect given the novelty of the position at the NSA,
Richards is still working out her office’s role and procedures. She reports
that the office, which currently has six other employees, has three main
functions: providing advice to NSA’s Director, developing civil liberties and
privacy protections, and enhancing public transparency. Her priority, she
says, is to “build in” evaluation of civil liberties and privacy interests as part
of the NSA’s mission processes. The compliance office will continue to
manage compliance, and the Office of the General Counsel, legal analysis.
But the new Civil Liberties and Privacy Office should be, she says, “the
focal point at NSA for assessing mission-related civil liberties and privacy
risks, helping with mitigation strategies, and communicating as appropriate
with the public.” The office brings “a different perspective” into NSA
conversations in furtherance of the goal of “reduc[ing] the impact of
surveillance on ordinary people.” The job is both procedural and substantive:
“My job is to bring together mission folks, and others to ask, systematically,
what are we doing and why, and whether the privacy and civil liberties
impacts are worth the operational gain.” What’s new about her office, she
says, is that “we are taking a more comprehensive civil liberties and privacy
risk assessment process that allows decision-makers to consider a broader set
http://perma.cc/FFE4-34MX (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Defense Privacy and Civil
Liberties Office: Organizational Structure, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://perma.cc/6CRRCEQS (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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of civil liberties and privacy values beyond the Constitutional
considerations, the laws and judicial interpretation.” In addition, Richards
does substantial outreach, spending “quite a bit of [her] time engaging with
the various privacy groups to better understand their concerns and share that
within NSA.” 122
Richards points to “new presidential direction” as part of the impetus
for change that underlies her new role. She anticipates that sometimes the
result will be a decision by the NSA “not to pursue certain mission
activities.” Other times the advice may not be to avoid an activity, but rather
“protections that mitigate civil liberties and privacy impacts.” 123
So far, the visible output of the new office has been two unclassified
papers, one submitted to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB), summarizing surveillance under FISA Section 702 and the
various policies that apply to it, 124 and one about non-bulk collection under
12,333. 125 Richards received some criticism from observers who found the
papers too positive; the surveillance go-to blog Emptywheel described the
first one as “propaganda” that “doesn’t so much read as an independent
statement on the privacy assessment of the woman at the NSA mandated
with overseeing it, but rather a highly scripted press release.” 126 Others have
disagreed. For example, one commentator called the 702 paper “remarkable
for its transparency.” 127 Richards defends these types of documents as
appropriate steps towards transparency, pointing out that the NSA has never
produced such reports in the past. She emphasizes that she does not
conceptualize public criticism of the NSA as part of her new office’s role.
The idea, rather, is to advocate internally for and implement civil liberties
and privacy protections, and then advise the public what those protections
are. The IG’s office, the PCLOB, and other entities can deliver public
criticism. 128
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3. NSA Office of Inspector General
The work of the NSA Office of Inspector General is authorized or
required by statute, 129 internal Department of Defense directives, 130 and the
FISA minimization rules themselves. IG staff play no role in NSA
compliance development work—the engineering, procedure development,
and the like. But their work with respect to audits and incident investigation
complements that of the compliance office—absent the “rules coach”
approach. Instead, the IG’s stance is more independent—such independence
is, for this as for other federal IGs, 131 the basic assignment. 132 This kind of
task-duplication but not role-duplication obtains more generally, too. IG
inspections related to compliance matters are carried out in tandem, but not
jointly, with either the compliance office or the Office of General Counsel,
so that each is done by both ordinary agency and independent staff. When
the IG investigates potentially criminal misconduct, however, its jurisdiction
within NSA is generally exclusive.

129
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Others have written extensively about Intelligence Community IG’s
Offices, 133 examining the parameters of their independence and efficacy.
IG’s Offices clearly vary in their aggressiveness, expertise, and influence. 134
I have little to add here, except to note that IG’s offices are focused in nearly
all their activity on whether their agencies have followed applicable rules—
and not on evaluation of those rules’ content. Indeed, the joining of
misconduct investigations and other compliance reviews in the single entity
of an IG’s office must tend to reinforce this mindset. The current NSA
Inspector General, George Ellard, confirmed in a rare public appearance that
he considers his oversight to cover the legality, not the wisdom, of NSA
operations. Asked what he would have done if Snowden had come to him
with complaints about the telephone metadata program, Ellard explained that
he had an obligation to independently assess the program’s constitutionality.
And discussing the efficacy of existing oversight systems, he emphasized the
rarity of intentional law violations. Not once, however, did he hint that the
NSA IG’s Office might ever independently assess program justifications or
successes, to evaluate whether surveillance’s costs to liberty were
worthwhile. 135
4. NSA Office of General Counsel
NSA’s Office of General Counsel is the heart of intelligence legalism
at NSA. Its role is more complex than that of the offices described above.
Like the compliance office and the IG’s office, NSA OGC lawyers promote
compliance with the applicable rules, including by working on the
133
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development of compliance training and sharing various reporting
obligations with the IG’s office staff. But OGC lawyers add to the mix rule
interpretation: they help to determine what the rules mean by giving legal
advice and participating in litigation.
Like the compliance office and the IG’s office, NSA’s OGC has
responsibility—usually but not always partial responsibility—for various
oversight tasks. 136 Under the telephony metadata minimization procedures,
for example, NSA OGC staff are required to meet with staff from the
compliance office and the Department of Justice National Security Division
(NSD), described in the next section, to “assess[] compliance with this
Court’s orders. Included in this meeting will be a review of NSA’s
monitoring and assessment to ensure that only approved metadata is being
acquired.” 137 Along with NSD, NSA OGC must also “review a sample of the
justifications for [Reasonable Articulable Suspicion] RAS approvals for
selection terms used to query the BR metadata.” 138 And when term searching
is used on communications surveilled under Executive Order 12,333, a
review of those terms is required to be performed by operational supervisors,
with “[a] copy of the results of the review . . . provided to the Inspector
General (IG) and the GC,” 139 for their further review. More generally, under
the DOD rules implementing Executive Order 12,333, the General Counsel
(along with the Inspector General) is required to submit quarterly reports to
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
(ATSD(IO)), setting out “significant oversight activities undertaken during
the quarter and any suggestions for improvements in the oversight
system.” 140 Under the same DOD Directive, the OGC and OIG oversight
roles extend to compliance problems as well: a quarterly report is required
“describing those activities that come to their attention during the quarter
reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive order or
Presidential directive, or applicable DOD policy; and actions taken with
respect to such activities.” 141
In fact, observers report that NSA’s Office of General Counsel plays
very much the lead role within the agency with respect to non-compliance.
“As a practical matter,” one senior IC lawyer says, “non-compliance
identification and remediation seem to be driven by the lawyers.” 142 When
136
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an issue of potential non-compliance arises, “it’s really the lawyers driving
the questions in terms of the factual development, the analysis in terms of
whether it’s legal, and the subsequent reporting.” Even lawyers describe this
as perhaps an historical artifact, rather than an ideal organizational
arrangement: “Maybe once you have a mature robust compliance structure,
it shouldn’t be driven by the lawyers. But that’s definitely how it works” at
the NSA. 143
By this point, it should be clear that many NSA employees are
assigned to compliance work—promoting rule-following and detecting and
preventing rule violations. What NSA OGC adds more uniquely is
application of law to fact and rule interpretation when there is ambiguity.
This kind of legal advice is the most basic output of an agency law office.
Like, I imagine, most federal Offices of General Counsel, NSA OGC
provides both formal and informal advice. For example, many NSA training
slides include references to day-to-day informal legal advice available from
OGC lawyers: “Questions? Office of General Counsel (Operations/Intel
Law) NSOC [National Security Operations Center] has an attorney on call
24/7!” And USSID 18 formally assigns NSA’s OGC the role of
“[r]eview[ing] and assess[ing] for legal implications as requested by the
DIRNSA/CSS [the NSA Director], Deputy Director, IQ, Signals Intelligence
Director, or their designees, all new major requirements and internally
generated USSS [U.S. SIGINT System] activities.” 144 In fact, the agency’s
General Counsel is designated to be the final decisionmaker on certain
questions framed as legal. For example, under the NSA’s metadata
programs, OGC reviews any “RAS” (reasonable articulable suspicion)
determination relating to a U.S. person to ensure that it is not based solely on
First-Amendment protected activity. 145 Similarly, it is OGC that reviews and
decides the appropriateness of proposed disseminations of U.S. person
information that might infringe on attorney/client or doctor/patient privilege,
or that involves criminal activity or judicial proceedings in the United
States. 146 In addition, much advice is provided as part of litigation support, a
key avenue by which agency lawyers exercise influence. As in many
agencies, NSA litigation is both affirmative (the FISA docket) and
defensive, 147 and OGC lawyers are important gatekeepers not only for
formal litigation but also for its executive analogue under Executive Order
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12,333, even though the Department of Justice has closer to final authority
for FISA matters, and final authority for non-FISA matters. 148
One key question about all this legal advice is whether it is ever
constraining—whether the lawyers ever tell their clients no. NSA’s lawyers
do sometimes advise their clients/colleagues not to do specific things. One
released training document, for example, advises analysts not to use certain
search techniques, cautioning: “Do Not: Wildcard domains. Wildcard user
names. Wildcard across domains.” 149 One would expect agency counsel to
say no with relative ease where the rules are clear and when those rules
govern how and not whether a particular activity can occur. It is crucial to
remember, however, that agency lawyer advice-giving is not adjudication
and agency lawyers are not judges. The judicial ideal of even-handedness is
not, even theoretically, applicable. Rather, the goal of legal advice for
lawyers within the Intelligence Community, as with any organization’s
lawyers, is to assist the client. To quote the same senior IC lawyer, “you’re
hoping to get done what your client wants to get done, so there’s a tendency
to try to find the most room to get that done.” 150 Or, in the less careful words
of a former NSA chief analyst, “Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers and
their entire job is figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize
collection by exploiting every loophole.” 151 Unsurprisingly, then, some
training slides that say no also include work-arounds—methods for
achieving various searching or analytic goals that are not covered by the
stricter FISA rules. 152
But what about when the issues are less clear, and the advice is not
how but whether to undertake some proposed action? Here, one should
expect lawyers to offer even less constraint on their agencies. Consider a
2005 speech to the NSA’s lawyers and their colleagues, by then-Deputy
148
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Attorney General James Comey, in which he praised the NSA’s lawyers as
“custodian[s] of our constitution and the rule of law.” Their “commitment to
the rule of law,” he explained, not only served American constitutionalism,
but would also protect their agency from “the damage that comes from the
pendulum swings of American public life, the pendulum swings that pushed
us so far backwards in the late 1970s, again in the late 1980s.” And, he said,
their training as lawyers equipped them to develop and act on the
understanding that “in the long run, intelligence under law is the only
sustainable intelligence in the country.” Comey’s speech was evidently
intended to stiffen his audience members’ backbones; he exhorted them to
say “‘yes’ when it can be,” but “‘no’ when it must be.” That language (“can”
versus “must”) favors “yes” over “no,” of course. As in all representation
settings, lawyers’ professional commitments to the rule of law are coupled
with their professional commitments to serve their clients’ interests and
projects. 153 Agency lawyers are unlikely to lie down on the railroad tracks to
stop an agency train; they are far more inclined by training, career
incentives, and professional norms, to construct arguments to justify the
train’s forward motion. And when at least some of the lawyers’ colleagues
are arguing that lives are at stake, saying no is particularly hard. To quote
Comey again:
It can be hard . . . because the stakes couldn’t be higher. Hard
because we are likely to hear the words: “If we don’t do this,
people will die.” You can all supply your own this: “If we
don’t collect this type of information,” or “If we don’t use
this technique,” or “If we don’t extend this authority.” It is
extraordinarily difficult to be the attorney standing in front of
the freight train that is the need for “this.” Because we don’t
want people to die. In fact, we have chosen to devote our
lives to institutions whose sworn duty it is to prevent that,
whose sworn duty it is to protect our country, our fellow
Americans. 154
A recent book by long-time CIA career lawyer (and, at one time, its
acting General Counsel) John Rizzo encapsulates agency lawyers’ position
in its title: Company Man. 155 Rizzo’s book, in which he simultaneously touts
his own influence and his disinclination to use it, demonstrates several times
over that intelligence lawyers are not likely to shut down programs dear to
their clients. Writing, for example, about the illegal arms-for-hostages deal
of Iran-Contra, Rizzo ruminates:
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Perhaps things might have turned out differently if I had
been given a say—for a time I was pleased to believe that—
but the truth is they probably wouldn’t have. The arms-forhostages initiative was conceived and approved at the highest
levels [and] in all likelihood I would have gone along,
whatever my private misgivings might have been.” 156
Similarly, describing his part in signing off on “enhanced interrogation
techniques” for captured terrorists, such as waterboarding, Rizzo states, “My
experience gave me confidence that I could squelch at least the more
aggressive proposed EITs [enhanced interrogation techniques], then and
there, if I wanted to. It would have been a relatively easy thing to do,
actually.” 157 But Rizzo did not say no.
The public record does not allow comprehensive assessment of how
high stakes legal advice has played out at the NSA. When asked not simply
about application of rules within a program but about that program’s
permissibility altogether, it may be that one of NSA’s General Counsels has
said no, counseling the agency that it cannot undertake some program or
activity to which NSA’s Director or even more senior executive officials are
committed. No such situations, however, have yet been disclosed. Rather,
we have abundant evidence that NSA’s lawyers are—as any organization’s
lawyers would likely be—professionally disposed against even plausible—
though not iron-clad—legal challenges to their agency’s authority.
Recounting a day spent at the NSA, Steve Vladeck summarizes:
[W]hat became increasingly clear as the day wore on is how
unable the NSA is to appreciate the possibility that the rules
themselves might be legally or constitutionally invalid. . . .
Several of the officials bristled at any suggestion that the
agency was actually exceeding its legal authority, even
though there are good arguments on both statutory and
constitutional grounds. We heard several times how frivolous
the Fourth Amendment challenge to the metadata program
must be. Yet, just four days after the visit, the district court in
Washington issued a decision to the contrary. 158
Probably, agency counsel lack the perspectival distance—and perhaps the
stature—to veto important agency initiatives. We saw this dynamic in effect
in the case of the brief 2004 shutdown of the “President’s Surveillance
Program” internet metadata collection. “NSA leadership, including OGC
lawyers and the IG,” had ratified the program as lawful based on the
156
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stretched argument that “NSA did not actually ‘acquire’ communications
until specific communications were selected” for analysis—that is, until
communications “hit” on a search. 159 It was not NSA career lawyers or their
political appointee boss, NSA General Counsel Robert Dietz, 160 who
triggered the hospital-bed confrontation that led to the temporary shutdown,
or who then led the way in persuading the FISA Court to allow this aspect of
the President’s Surveillance Program to be squeezed into FISA’s Pen
Register title. 161 The lawyers who first concluded that the program was
illegal as constituted and then stood up to the President’s counsel and Chief
of Staff, and to Vice President Cheney and his counsel, 162 were higherranked, and worked at the more prestigious and bureaucratically separate
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, 163 where they were, in the
end, supported by Deputy Attorney General James Comey, himself
supported by the ill Attorney General John Ashcroft.
Putting aside high ranking Department of Justice lawyers, federal
agency counsel typically lack the stature to flout the views of White House
lawyers. And this may be particularly true for the NSA. Consider that when
the NSA’s General Counsel asked to see the first Office of Legal Counsel
opinion ratifying the initial internet metadata program, the White House
declined even to share it. 164 Even if NSA’s lawyers, up to the General
Counsel, wanted to find a given program unlawful, their legal opinion could
be less influential than that of similarly placed counsel in other agencies,
because the extremely comprehensive involvement of the Department of
Justice’s National Security Division depresses the agency lawyers’ ultimate
authority: NSA OGC functions as something of a junior partner to the NSD
and its leadership. (On the other hand, NSA OGC’s position as the NSA’s
ordinary point of contact with the Department of Justice, following the
bureaucratic logic that likes should link to like, simultaneously augments the
bureaucratic influence of NSA OGC in more run-of-the-mill situations.)
And so it seems most likely that NSA OGC’s advice in legally
ambiguous, high-stakes situations poses little obstacle to proposed agency
activities. The practical reality that lawyers are not very constraining goes
hand in glove with their growing numbers and dockets inside intelligence
159

NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 38. This argument is attractive enough to
intelligence operators that it rears its head periodically, notwithstanding its implausibility as
a matter of text and policy. In Klayman, for example, the district court rejected the
argument, proffered by the government, that “‘the mere collection of Plaintiffs’ telephony
metadata . . . without review of the data pursuant to a query’ cannot be considered a search
‘because the Government’s acquisition of an item without examining its contents ‘does not
compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents.’” Klayman v. Obama, 957
F. Supp. 2d. 1, 29 n.40 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Govt.’s Opp’n at 49 n.33).
160
See, e.g., BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 1, at 116.
161
NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 40–42.
162
BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 1, at 280–86.
163
See Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Review of the
Legality of the STELLAR WIND Program (May 6, 2005), http://perma.cc/X8D4-7LXA.
164
2009 NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 21.
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agencies. In an article two decades ago, intelligence official Dorian Greene
repeated Richard Willard’s earlier description of the IC’s negative views of
lawyers—“enormous pent-up hostility in the intelligence community toward
lawyers and legalistic restrictions.” 165 Greene attested in 1994 that “ten years
later this general attitude has not shown any remarkable change.” 166
Switching to the perspective of the lawyers themselves, he described theirs
as an “uncomfortable position,” because “[s]imultaneously the lawyer is
both a servant for the [intelligence] community during the course of its
relations with the remainder of the federal government and an oversight
functionary within the community itself.” 167 But over the past two decades,
and particularly the latter of them, much has shifted. Lawyers—with their
interpretive skills combined with their client commitments—have grown to
be attractive advisors for operators and policymakers, 168 and their numbers
have multiplied accordingly. And it is fair to say that the discomfort Greene
identifies has been substantially reduced; intelligence community lawyers
now navigate their oversight and counseling roles with little evident internal
conflict. 169 The discussion above demonstrates that the basic method for
bringing the two roles into alignment is that the oversight function focuses
on errors and the counseling function focuses on clarity and risk. Neither
asks the NSA’s lawyers to assume a judge-like neutral stance: this is legal
interpretation within a role of client-service and under significant
bureaucratic limits. And neither the oversight function nor the counseling
function asks lawyers to assess, not merely interpret and apply, the rules.
Neither, that is, prompts lawyers to ask the should rather than the can
question. The NSA’s OGC thus exemplifies the limited, though important,
impact of intelligence legalism.
Taken together, these offices instantiate NSA’s strong commitment
to intelligence legalism—and its strong, although perhaps lessening,
disinclination to itself weighing interests and evaluating policy. Former NSA
165

Greene, supra note 34, at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
167
Id. at 91.
168
Even the famous contests that occurred soon after 9/11 happened on legalistic terrain:
Vice President Cheney, his aide David Addington, and their DOJ lawyer-of-choice, John
Yoo, dressed up their power grabs in the guise of law, complete with legal opinions. See,
e.g., Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, Memorandum for the Attorney General
(Nov. 2, 2001), http://perma.cc/SK8N-4YU3. Admittedly, though, their central claim—that
the executive’s national security power is, as a matter of constitutional law, unfettered by
purportedly constraining statute—is anti-legalistic. See id. (“FISA only provides a safe
harbor for electronic surveillance, and cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in
warrantless searches that protect the national security.”; “FISA purports to be the exclusive
statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. . . . Such a
reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s Article II
authorities.”). In the end, though, that claim was a gambit that failed.
169
For analysis of the dynamics of federal lawyers’ offices, see, for example, sources cited
supra note 34; Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1058–62, 1072–73 (2011).
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(and CIA) Director Michael Hayden put the point clearly when he said in
July 2013: “Give me the box you will allow me to operate in. I’m going to
play to the very edges of that box; I’m going to be very aggressive. . . . I’ll
get chalk-dust on my cleats, I’ll be so close to the out-of-bounds
markers.” 170 More recently, former NSA Deputy Director Chris Inglis
framed the point in terms of NSA’s orientation not just towards civil liberties
but more generally, describing the NSA as “an operational not a policy
shop.” 171
B. Department of Justice National Security Division (NSD)
The offices just described are within the NSA. Currently, the most
important external executive branch participant in NSA’s compliance
ecosystem is the Department of Justice, and in particular its National
Security Division (NSD). NSD, headed by its own Assistant Attorney
General, was established in 2006 to bring together several previously
separate offices within the Department of Justice. It has grown substantially
in the years since; its budget documents about 235 lawyers, divided between
offices that prosecute national security crimes and offices that deal with nonprosecutorial intelligence matters. 172 The prominence of NSD in NSA
matters follows from the basic legalistic approach to intelligence reform in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, as embodied in FISA and Executive Order
12,333. Infusing intelligence activities with law was accomplished not only
by a new substantive legal framework in FISA, subject to court enforcement,
but also by empowering the Department of Justice. Indeed, it is Department
of Justice lawyers who appear in the FISA court and therefore must sign off
on any FISA application. 173 Thus when the NSA wanted to ask the FISA
170

Interview of former NSA Director General Michael Hayden by Charlie Rose (July 29,
2013), http://perma.cc/Q83V-422B; see also Testimony of Michael Hayden, Hearing before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 5, 2008), at 97–98,
http://perma.cc/K3J2-LLW4. (“Let me say something very clearly, Senator. I really need to
put this on the record. We will play to the edges of the box that the American political
process gives us. In the creation of that box, if we’re asked a view, we’ll give a view. But
the lines drawn by that box are the product of the American political process. Once you’ve
drawn the box, once that process creates a box, we have a duty to play to the edge of it;
otherwise, we’re not protecting America, and we may be protecting ourselves. . . . So there’s
no wink and nod here. If you create the box, we will play inside the box without
exception.”).
171
Chris Inglis, Robert S. Strauss Center, NSA at the Crossroads (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://perma.cc/QDM4-FLVR.
172
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION
Ex. I (2013), http://perma.cc/5U4A-J9RD.
173
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT 22
(2008) [hereinafter NSD 2008 PROGRESS REPORT], http://perma.cc/7WD7-YGT8 (“The
Department’s primary oversight in the national security realm has traditionally focused on
the FBI’s use of FISA and compliance with FISA Court orders—a responsibility that
derived principally from our obligations as the Government’s representative to the FISA
Court.”). Currently, this function is carried by the Operations Section of the Office of
Intelligence, in NSD; prior to NSD’s 2006 creation, it was performed by the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review, which sat outside any DOJ Division, and reported directly
to the Deputy Attorney General. Sometimes this gatekeeping role is made explicit. See, e.g.,

2015 / Intelligence Legalism and the NSA’s Civil Liberties Gaps

153

court for permission to restart automated queries of internet metadata, it
described the first step as “seeking DoJ approval.” 174 Currently, this
approval role is played by lawyers in the NSD Office of Intelligence. These
FISA Court dynamics are similar to—although more extreme than—the
ways Department of Justice lawyers influence legal matters across
government in any arena subject to very frequent litigation. But even for
legal questions not immediately addressed in front of the FISA Court, the
views of NSD lawyers become at least close to authoritative within the
executive branch, because the issue might eventually end up in the FISA
Court. Accordingly, NSA frequently seeks legal advice not only from its
own General Counsel’s office but from DOJ NSD. In fact this is
occasionally required by FISA minimization rules, 175 a striking departure
from ordinary agency counsel practice and authority.
Moreover, since the 1980s, there have been many other equally
important levers of Justice Department influence that are more unusual. The
Attorney General’s decisionmaking authority over the various process
documents required by E.O. 12,333, discussed above, is only the most
obvious example. An important separate avenue is the situations in which
the Attorney General has approval authority for particular surveillance
operations. 176
In addition, there is a great deal of routine oversight work, most done
by an oversight group within the NSD Office of Intelligence. 177 The NSD
oversight role is institutionalized in both USSID 18 and several of the FISA
minimization procedures, and comes in three flavors. First, under each of the

2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(vii), at 13 (“Prior to
implementation, all proposed automated query processes shall be reviewed and approved by
NSA’s OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.”).
174
Memorandum from La Forrest Williams, Deputy Assoc. Dir., Legislative Affairs Office,
Nat’l Sec. Agency, to the Majority Staff Director, S. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 3 (Apr. 10, 2009), http://perma.cc/Z64Z-DF47.
175
See, e.g., 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(iii), at 12 (“NSA’s
OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal opinions that relate to the
interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this authority. When operationally
practicable, such consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as
soon as practicable.”); Primary Order, No. PR-TT § (5)(i)(i) (FISA Ct. [date redacted])
[hereinafter
Reggie
Walton
PR/TT
Primary
Order],
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0063-0002.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZA8K-HYK2] (“NSA’s OGC shall consult with the Department of
Justice’s National Security Division (NSD) on all significant legal opinions that relate to the
interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in advance;
otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.”).
176
50 U.S.C. § 1805(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (Section 702); USSID 18, supra note 49, §§
4.1(b)(1), 4.4(b), 5.4(a) (authorizing surveillance, and retention of certain communications,
on the authority of the Attorney General).
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National Security Division: Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/nsd/sections-offices#oversight (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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FISA authorities discussed in this Article, the Attorney General owes annual
or semi-annual reports to Congress. 178 These reports are drafted by NSD’s
Office of Intelligence, 179 and necessarily require relevant agencies to report
to the Attorney General the information to be passed along. Moreover, it is
NSD that determines (subject, no doubt, to review and negotiation with
others) how various issues are framed. The office plays a far smaller role in
non-FISA collection, 180 but even then the rules sometimes similarly require
reporting of particular events to the Attorney General. 181 Second, the FISA
minimization rules sometimes assign DOJ lawyers a specified task. For
FISA Title I surveillance, for example, NSD is required to establish
procedures to “protect . . . [attorney-client] communications from review or
use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelligence
contained therein.” 182 And third, at least for those FISA programs we have
full information on, the minimization procedures require NSD Office of
Intelligence lawyers to review NSA’s compliance record periodically. The
review seems to range from quite minimal, for FISA Title I warrants and
Section 702 foreign targeting, 183 to extremely involved, for the Section 215

178

50 U.S.C. § 1808 (electronic surveillance warrants); 50 U.S.C. § 1826 (physical
searches); 50 U.S.C. § 1846 (pen/trap orders); 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (annual, business
records/tangible things); 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (all of the above, plus foreign targeting orders);
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l) (compliance assessment for Section 702 targeting and minimization);
50 U.S.C. § 1881f (Section 702, 703, 704) (“Not less frequently than once every 6 months,
the Attorney General shall fully inform, in a manner consistent with national security, the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, consistent with the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Standing Rules of the Senate, and Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress or any successor Senate resolution, concerning the implementation of this
subchapter.”). In addition, the Attorney General owes an annual report on FISA warrants
sought, granted, modified, or denied. 50 U.S.C. § 1807.
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National Security Division: Sections and Offices, supra note 177 (“[T]he Oversight
Section is responsible for meeting numerous Congressional reporting requirements,
including several FISA semi-annual reports, submission of certain FISC orders to Congress,
and submission of FBI statistical information.”).
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See, e.g., Testimony of John Carlin before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
(Feb. 25, 2014), at 44:37, http://perma.cc/62SW-KP6J (“But the collection activities that
occur pursuant to 12333, if there was incidental collection, would be handled through a
different set of oversight mechanisms than the [Justice] Department’s–by the [NSA] Office
of Compliance, the Inspector General there, the General Counsel there, and the Inspector
General and General Counsel’s office for the Intelligence Community writ large, as well as
reporting to these committees as appropriate.”). I was alerted to this exchange by Does
Acting National Security Division Head John Carlin Know about FISA Sections 703 and
704?, EMPTYWHEEL (Feb. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/WF5W-5NVU.
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USSID 18, supra note 49, § 4.1(e).
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USSID 18, supra note 49, Annex A, App. 1, § 4(a)(3)(b).
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For FISA Title I, NSD is required to review “at least a representative sampling” of
disseminated communications, to make sure they comply with the rules on dissemination.
“The results of each review shall be made available to the Attorney General or a designee.”
USSID 18, supra note 49, Annex A, App. 1, § 8(d). For FISA 702, see SECTION 702 NSA
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 54, § 3(b)(6) (“The Department of Justice’s
National Security Division and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will
conduct oversight of NSA’s activities with respect to United States persons that are
conducted pursuant to this paragraph.”).
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telephony metadata program. 184 NSD’s role in the now-ended internet
metadata program also became quite extensive, although that was not the
case at the start of the program. 185 Both the second and third type of work
have grown substantially since the 2004 FISA Court ratification of the
internet metadata program, and particularly since 2009 compliance troubles
in both the internet and telephony metadata programs and 2011 compliance
troubles involving Section 702 foreign targeting. Whether at the
government’s behest or originating with the FISA Court judges or staff, the
minimization procedures approved by the FISA Court keep adding to NSD’s
role. 186
NSD lawyers have been criticized both as too interested in civil
liberties and not enough in national security, and as unduly aggressive. From
the right, the office has faced loud accusations that it acquiesced too readily
to the view of FISA court judges that national security surveillance had to be
walled off from the criminal justice system; 187 only after 9/11, and the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, did the Department finally appeal the
issue to the FISA Court of Review, and win. 188 As former NSD lawyer
Carrie Cordero summarized the history in congressional testimony,
itemizing several other incidents, “the Department of Justice was accused of
being too reticent, too cautious, too unwilling to be aggressive under the law
in order to protect the national security.” 189 From the left, however—and
particularly more recently—the argument is reversed. Again quoting
Cordero (who describes the shift as “ironic”), it is “that we need more
lawyers scrutinizing already well-scrubbed applications; and that the
government should be putting forth more cautious interpretations of the
184

For the telephony metadata program, see 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra
note 130. NSD reviews all the training and briefing, and the justifications for RAS
approvals for selection terms used to query the BR metadata. Id. at §§ F(i), (iv). In addition,
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F(v).
185
See Application for Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign
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http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0028-0002.pdf
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221 (2008).

156

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 6

law.” 190 Cordero herself has written that neither argument is correct. Rather,
she says, NSD is “a neutral party that evaluates the Intelligence
Community’s requests for surveillance.” 191
Admittedly, Cordero’s “neutral” comment was made in a blog, and
may have been a little casual. But the description above demonstrates that,
structurally, NSD’s lawyers are indeed expected to function, simultaneously,
as lawyers for their client agencies and fair quasi-adjudicators. As Nancy
Libin, the former Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer for the Department of
Justice, puts it, the NSD is “this place that the IC goes to get blessed.” Libin
comments that this creates “a structural problem,” because lawyers
representing the IC “can get captured by the IC.” 192 Libin’s substantive point
seems to me to be absolutely correct—although the term “capture” is not
quite apropos, because NSD lawyers in the Office of Intelligence are not IC
outsiders, but IC lawyers. Their immediate colleagues and their bosses are
responsible for national security prosecutions using the fruits of the
surveillance they ratify. Neither their roles, reference groups, nor career
aspirations support a norm of quasi-judicial neutrality.
Stepping back a bit to evaluate all of this, NSD lawyers bring to their
FISA and oversight work several key characteristics. One is the lawyerly
mindset, which merges careful textual analysis and a keen eye for helpful
ambiguity. Another is a commitment to their client’s operational success. A
third is a natural desire, as repeat players in front of the FISA court, to
safeguard their own credibility. And perhaps a fourth is the embracing of
rule of law values—the ideas of intelligence legalism, that law should matter
in the realm of intelligence. All four characteristics are reinforced by NSD
lawyers’ role, reference group, and career aspirations. All four inform their
approach to being both counsel to the government and officers of the FISA
court, exhibiting candor and care but pressing aggressive pro-government
positions unless those positions are rejected by the court or are likely to be
rejected. Recent accounts suggest that within the Department of Justice,
NSD at least occasionally takes aggressive pro-surveillance positions. Just to
cite one example, until the Solicitor General directed a more defendantfriendly reading, “the division . . . long used a narrow understanding of what
‘derived from’ means in terms of when it must disclose specifics to
defendants” explaining that evidence in their criminal case had its origin in
warrantless wiretaps. 193 The point is not that NSD’s lawyers were right or
wrong about this position. It is that if a credible argument can be made in
support of their clients’ proposals, and the FISA judges have not rejected
that argument, one would expect NSD lawyers to make it.
190
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And just as it is wrong to expect neutrality from NSD, it would be
foolish to expect a more thorough-going civil liberties orientation. NSD’s
lawyers are not civil rights or civil liberties lawyers: they are not hired for
their civil liberties experience or orientation towards civil liberties; they are
not asked to perform a civil liberties function; and their next jobs are rarely,
if ever, civil liberties jobs. It is unsurprising that when the FISA judges were
building the now-dismantled “wall,” those Department of Justice
intelligence lawyers who frequently appeared before them would respect and
even support that approach. But unlike with civil liberties lawyers, there is
every reason to predict that NSD lawyers would avoid pro-civil liberties
positions in the face of court indifference to the individual interests at
stake—and no evidence to the contrary has thus far been disclosed.
It is worth emphasizing that NSD’s lead role within the Department
of Justice is less than a decade old. NSD’s immediate predecessor was the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), a freestanding office that
handled FISA and other intelligence matters. 194 OIPR was itself a 1979
offshoot of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); prior to its establishment,
OLC lawyer Mary Lawton was the lead Department of Justice intelligence
lawyer, and she maintained that role when she led OIPR for a decade. 195
During that period, contemporaries described the new office as a “‘mini
Office of Legal Counsel’ with respect to any issue concerning intelligence
policy.” 196 The actual Office of Legal Counsel continued to play a crucial
role as well—this is evident in the hospital bed episode described in the
Introduction, which were prompted by OLC head Jack Goldsmith’s qualms
about the President’s surveillance program, 197 and in the first telephony
metadata application to the FISA Court, whose approval subjected that
program to judicial supervision, which was, remarkably, signed not only by
the head of OIPR but also by the head of OLC (which rarely takes formal
part in litigation). 198 As with NSD lawyers, I think it would be implausible
to expect neutrality from OLC lawyers; their role within the government is,
in part, to defend executive prerogative. 199 At the same time, if it were OLC
lawyers doing FISA oversight, the dynamics might well be quite different
194
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2009),
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Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–42 (2006); Trevor W. Morrison,
Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1460–70 (2010).
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than I have described. Just to name two key differences, OLC lawyers would
not have the repeat appearances before the FISA Court, and they are often
called upon to play a quasi-judicial role within the executive branch (their
legal memoranda are even given the title of “decisions”). But while OLC
lawyers continue to be extremely involved in legal issues related to national
security that reach the National Security Council, 200 with the establishment
and growth of NSD, led by a Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General,
OLC’s relative role with respect to FISA and surveillance has shrunk. NSD
is the key FISA office within the Department of Justice.
C. Other Intelligence Oversight Offices
Other offices oversee some of the tasks and activities already
described. For non-FISA matters, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) receives mandatory reports by each element of the
Intelligence Community of “any intelligence activities of their organizations
that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive
order or presidential directive.” 201 The reports are shared within ODNI with
the Office of General Counsel, the Civil Liberties Protection Office, and
Mission Integration Division. They are then relayed to the Intelligence
Oversight Board (IOB), in the White House, along with an ODNI
“assessment of the gravity, frequency, trends, and patterns of occurrences”
of reportable incidents, a summary of corrective actions taken and related
recommendations, and an assessment of their effectiveness. 202 This process
simultaneously increases ODNI information about compliance issues across
the IC, and the salience of compliance incidents within the IC elements
themselves when the heads of the IC elements (and therefore many other
lead officials within each element) read the relevant reports. 203 The IOB
itself, currently a committee of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board,
brings together non-governmental experts (usually former high-ranking
government officials) to advise the President 204 ; it is extremely low
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Intelligence Agency, No. C 09-3351 SBA, 2013 WL 5443048 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013)
(filed July 22, 2009), https://www.eff.org/document/complaint-16.
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204
The PIAB has a small professional staff within the Executive Office of the President. See
About the PIAB, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://perma.cc/S3Y3-LLM8 (last visited Nov. 10,
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profile, 205 and there is no public information on what it does with the
compliance reports it receives, although FOIA requests have led to the
disclosure of thousands of pages of those reports. 206
In addition, under the DOD rules implementing Executive Order
12,333, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
(abbreviated, unfortunately, ATSD(IO)) 207 also receives from NSA’s
General Counsel and Inspector General a “quarterly report describing those
activities that come to their attention during the quarter reasonably believed
to be illegal or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive, or
applicable DoD policy; and actions taken with respect to such activities,” as
well as “significant oversight activities undertaken during the quarter and
any suggestions for improvements in the oversight system.” 208
Neither ATSD(IO) nor ODNI has a principal part in FISA
oversight—DOJ oversight really has pride of place under FISA. 209 The
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exception is under Section 702, where in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act,
Congress expressly assigned ODNI as well as the Department of Justice to
“assess compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures. 210 To
produce semi-annual compliance assessments, ODNI’s Office of General
Counsel, Mission Integration Division, and Civil Liberties and Privacy
Office all make regular appearances in the NSA compliance ecosystem,
dealing with Section 702 foreign targeting and minimization. The work is
done every 60 days by a small team from ODNI (joined by a larger team
from DOJ NSD). 211
Given the topic of this paper, I am most interested in the ODNI Civil
Liberties Protection Office because its statutory authorities extend past legal
compliance to policy development—it is authorized to look at the “should”
question. One of the Office’s two foundational statutes requires its leader to:
(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element
and other officials of such department, agency, or
element in appropriately considering privacy and civil
liberties concerns when such officials are proposing,
developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies,
procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism;
and
(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a
particular governmental power the officer shall consider
whether such department, agency, or element has
established—
(A) that the need for the power is balanced with the need to
protect privacy and civil liberties;
(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such
department, agency, or element of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use. 212
The reference to “civil liberties concerns” (emphasis added) and
“balanc[ing]” suggest that this is not simply a compliance mission. ODNI’s
(“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as affecting the role of the Department of
Justice or the Attorney General under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”).
210
See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(1).
211
See compliance reports listed supra note 109. See also, e.g., SECTION 702 NSA
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 54, § 3(b)(6). The civil liberties office’s quarterly
reports also tally FISA compliance reviews each quarter beginning in Sept.–Nov. 2010.
Civil Liberties Privacy Office Reports, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
http://perma.cc/KR9X-MJXZ (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
212
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Civil Liberties and Privacy Office could, with statutory warrant, play a
policy role. It could push against the information imperatives, the desire to
“collect it all,” that motivate some at NSA, 213 urging more weight be given
to individual’s liberty and privacy interests as well as rights.
But if there is textual support for the idea that ODNI’s Civil Liberties
and Privacy Office has been assigned a civil liberties or privacy role that
runs deeper than compliance, that assignment is equivocal. Other language
in the office’s founding statutes is geared more towards compliance with
law. For example, the office is assigned by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) to “oversee compliance by the Office
and the Director of National Intelligence with requirements under the
Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing
guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy.” 214
Faced with this textual range, those who manage this small office
have chosen to frame its role, at least publically, primarily in compliance
terms. Its “enterprise strategy,” for example, states: “We are committed to
protecting fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including
freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.”215
Other documents, too, omit “balancing” type language or references to
“concerns,” preferring harder references to “violations” and “law.” 216
Alex Joel, the office’s director since its start up, explains that his
approach is consciously tied to legal requirements:
It’s been attractive to me to run the office as a law shop,
because we [government personnel] of course have to follow
the law. We have traditionally defined privacy and civil
liberties rights with reference to the law (including executive
orders). It’s important to emphasize that this is not optional,
that this is what the law requires. 217
It is not that Joel takes no position at ODNI and in interagency discussions
on policy matters; in fact he states that “I try to say, just like the President
recently said, ‘Just because we can do something, doesn’t mean we
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necessarily should.’” 218 But Joel sees persuading colleagues about what
ought to happen as harder than telling them what is required to happen,219
and while no doubt he and others on his staff give advice on the “should”
question, it is evident that with respect to the NSA, the office’s focus is
primarily compliance. For example, one of the Section 702 semiannual
compliance reviews has been released in a form that allows evaluation of its
content. Finalized in August 2013, it does not read very differently from the
NSA’s own released or leaked compliance work. Both deal with the precise
requirements of the targeting and minimization rules and the situations in
which errors have occurred. In fact, Joel has sought out detailees from DOJ
NSD to serve as his office’s designated staff for Section 702 compliance.220
Moreover, the office’s public statements have all been defenses of IC
policies and practices. 221
In short, the staff from these DOD, ODNI, and White House
overseeing offices all conceptualize their role as ensuring that the NSA’s
activities comply with the rules system that exists. At least as far as one can
observe from the written record so far released, none take their role to be
assessing whether the rules are appropriate, or whether conduct that is
compliant with the rules might nonetheless be ill advised.
D. FISA Court
In general, federal courts perform important, but limited, oversight of
federal official conduct. Doctrines like ripeness, finality, and standing, and,
especially, limits on inferred private rights of action, mean that courts are
closed to many, even most, potential claims of agency illegality. In keeping
with this ordinary situation, the vast majority of the NSA’s operations lie
outside court supervision. Executive Order 12,333 implements executive
rather than federal court involvement, and without a statutory framework,
court oversight is difficult to justify. Would-be challengers not only lack
knowledge that they are subject to surveillance and therefore have standing
to bring a challenge 222; as foreigners abroad, under current doctrine, they
often lack constitutional rights altogether. 223 (Although Presidential Policy
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Directive 28, announced by the President in January 2014, requires
consideration of the privacy interests of foreigners abroad. 224)
In the portion of its operations that proceed under FISA, however, in
many ways, the NSA lives with much more court oversight than do most
federal agencies. Most federal agencies, after all, do not need before-the-fact
court approval for routine operations. And while FISA warrants are similar
to criminal justice warrants, which issue with court approval, FISA metadata
programs actually involve much more court supervision than do the FBI’s
National Security Letters. 225 The result has been intense judicial
involvement in enforcement of the minimization rules—court orders, once
approved. In opinion after opinion, in both the internet and telephony
metadata programs and Section 702 targeted surveillance of foreigners
abroad, FISA court judges have delved into compliance incidents, their
sources, and their remedies. 226 At the same time, FISA judges have devoted
many fewer pages of the opinions so far declassified to the legitimacy—both
statutory and constitutional—of those NSA programs. Most starkly, it took
over seven years before any FISA judge actually wrote an opinion
explaining the Court’s repeated decisions to uphold bulk telephony metadata
collection programs. 227
The opinions suggest that the court is supervising the surveillance
process with close attention—but not adjudicating its merit. And in some
ways, that approach is inherent in the judicial role. I have distinguished
throughout this Article between “rights” or “compliance” or “law” on the
one hand, and “interests” or “balancing” or “policy” on the other. Courts,
including the FISA Court, sit on the law side of that divide. The dynamics of
judicial law-pronouncement are, however, very different than for executive
compliance work. Executive branch lawyers’ role commits them to the
search for “‘yes’ when it can be,” even if they are simultaneously capable of
delivering “‘no’ when it must be.” And executive lawyers tend to consider
their clients’ preferences close to binding on policy issues, when such issues
224
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arise. Judges, by contrast, begin with a norm of impartiality rather than client
service, and are far less constrained with respect to whatever policy issues
bear on their legal decision-making, as well as with respect to legal
interpretation itself. Thus the FISA Court could serve as a body that engages
in the “should” question, at least to some extent, as part of the legal
interpretive process. Other courts examining the permissibility of the NSA’s
FISA surveillance have done just that. 228
That the FISA Court did not take on the “should” question in any
significant way, prior to the Snowden disclosures, may be in part due to the
absence of adversarial briefing, as elaborated upon in Part IV. 229 But my
sense is that one-sided briefing is only part of the explanation. The FISA
Court’s one-party procedures have a deeper impact, as well. The ex parte
modality alters not just who communicates with the court but how the
government and court communicate with each other. Sometimes FISA
judges make their influence felt by the traditional judicial process of issuing
a decision: the 2009 order suspending the NSA’s access to internet
metadata 230 is one example. But much more often, facilitated by the ex parte
nature of the proceedings, it seems that the court’s views are delivered in the
form of less formal advice to the government. ODNI General Counsel
Robert Litt explained in congressional testimony in 2013:
When we prepare an application for a FISA [order], whether
it’s under [Section 702] or a traditional FISA [warrant], we
first submit to the court what’s called a read copy, which the
court staff will review and comment on. And they will
almost invariably come back with questions, concerns,
problems that they see, and there’s an iterative process back
and forth between the government and the FISA court to take
care of those concerns so that at the end of the day we’re
confident that we’re presenting something that the FISA
Court will approve. That is hardly a rubber stamp. It’s rather
extensive and serious judicial oversight of this process. 231
228
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One-party process thus accommodates a back-and-forth in which the
government gets several tries to alter—or, although Litt didn’t say so,
withdraw—its applications to avoid being turned down. 232 Often, as Litt
describes, the government is dealing not with a judge but with the FISA
Court’s handful of “legal advisors.” 233 These are long-term lawyer assistants
to the judges, who likely possess more influence than ordinary law clerks,
because they are experienced attorneys with government backgrounds in
surveillance law who serve for years at a time. They may therefore have
more expertise than the judges themselves, particularly towards the start of
the judges’ seven-year terms. 234
Even when the contact between the government and the court
involves the judges directly, it is clear that the procedures are sometimes
closer to a congressional briefing, say, than an ordinary judicial hearing,
even an ex parte one. For example, the NSA provided Senate Intelligence
Committee with the following description:
On September 1, 2009, at the request of the FISC, NSA
hosted Presiding Judge Bates and Judges Walton and Hogan
for a series of briefings and demonstrations regarding the BR
FISA program. The presenting included a briefing on BR
FISA data flow; a demonstration of how analysts log on to
NSA systems to access BR FISA data; a demonstration of
technical safeguards that prevent queries based on seed
numbers that do not mean the Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion (RAS) standard; and a demonstration of analyst
queries using RAS-approved telephone identifiers. The
information was presented in the context of a current
operation that concerns a potential threat to the U.S.
homeland. . . . The judges were engaged throughout and
asked questions, which were answered by the briefers and
other subject matter experts. At the conclusion, the judges
expressed their appreciation for the amount and quality of
information presented to them. 235
The briefing included a “working lunch,” and, as with so many such
sessions, a PowerPoint slide deck, complete with bullet points on the
232
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session’s purpose (“Demonstrate NSA’s dedication to compliance with the
Court Orders and demonstrate how NSA uses the BR FISA program
operationally in its counterterrorism missions while appropriately protecting
U.S. person privacy”). 236 It was apparently effective: on September 3, 2009,
the Court allowed the NSA to resume analysis of the Section 215 telephony
metadata suspended six months earlier. 237
Of course trial court judges in other courts deal with litigants in a
variety of contexts and using many approaches. 238 But the episodes just
described—advice-giving, iterative drafting, briefings—depart significantly
from the ordinary judicial mode, even while the FISA Court evidently
maintains enormous influence over FISA surveillance. It seems almost
unavoidable that this type of collaboration leads to a sense of shared effort
and enterprise. Other practices, such as an annual lunch bringing together
FISA Court judges and legal advisors (and the Chief Justice) with the heads
of the CIA, NSA, and FBI 239 likewise encourage the judges to conceptualize
themselves as participating with the IC in a common project. In any event,
while the FISA court superintends the surveillance process, clearly it does
not evaluate whether it should go forward at all. That superintendence is
rigorous, but limited.
E. PCLOB
Of the oversight institutions thus far described, only NSA’s brandnew Civil Liberties and Privacy Office engages in policy-type weighing of
civil liberties interests against the security benefits offered by particular
surveillance methods. The one office that remains to be discussed is the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent
bipartisan agency nominally within the executive branch. 240 As will be seen,
and as one would expect from what is essentially a blue-ribbon-commission
type organization with no enforcement or other executive function, the
PCLOB seems so far to be functioning at least partially free of the role
constraints of an executive agency.
In its first incarnation, as part of the Executive Office of the
President, 241 the PCLOB was an unimportant player in NSA’s operations. In
236
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its second, independent, incarnation, 242 it started operations only recently.
President Obama was slow to name the Board’s members, and the Senate
was even slower to confirm them 243 Its budget is tiny; it has only a handful
of full-time staff members (one on a detail from the Department of Justice),
in addition to its full-time chair and part-time members. 244 But after David
Medine’s long-awaited confirmation as chair in May 2013, 245 the Snowden
disclosures, one week later, prompted the Board to undertake a review of
FISA, the first part of which it completed in January 2014. 246
The board’s statute commits it firmly to a policy, not compliance,
function, requiring it to:
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to
protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for
such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and
civil liberties; and
(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered
in the development and implementation of laws, regulations,
and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against
terrorism. 247
Nonetheless, in its review of the telephony metadata program, the board
began with the language of law. Three of its five members—the three
Democrats—found that Section 215 “does not provide an adequate legal
basis to support the program,” and that the program also violates the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 248 The Board acknowledged that
the FISA Court had approved the program many times, but explained that it
found that approval unpersuasive: “Having independently examined this
statutory question, the Board disagrees with the conclusions of the
government and the FISA court.” 249 Pointing out that the program long
predated its authorization by the FISA Court under Section 215, the Board
concluded, after forty-five pages of statutory analysis: “It may have been a
laudable goal for the executive branch to bring this program under the
242
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supervision of the FISA court. Ultimately, however, that effort represents an
unsustainable attempt to shoehorn a preexisting surveillance program into
the text of a statute with which it is not compatible.” 250 Accordingly, it
wrote, the program should be halted. 251
The Board also analyzed the constitutional law issues raised by the
telephony metadata program. It explained that under the Supreme Court’s
existing doctrine, a Fourth Amendment challenge would fail. “It is possible
that the third-party doctrine or its scope will be judicially revised,” the Board
wrote—making clear its own view that this revision would be very welcome.
“To date, however, the Supreme Court has not modified the third-party
doctrine or overruled its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect telephone dialing records. Most courts continue to follow those
precedents, and government lawyers are entitled to rely on them, including
in their formulation and defense of the Section 215 program.” 252 On First
Amendment associational rights, the Board noted that standing doctrine had
so far obstructed full court testing of the rights, but that the challenge was far
from trivial. 253
It should be evident, then, that the PCLOB’s perspective on “the
law” was quite different from that of any federal agency staff. In its first
report, its members, among them a retired federal court of appeals judge,
assumed much more the stance of court of appeals judges. Holdings by
courts that are not the Supreme Court were treated as potentially persuasive,
but not binding. And even Supreme Court holdings were deemed potentially
undermined by subsequent changes of circumstances or surrounding
doctrine. The PCLOB members obviously felt far freer than agency counsel
do with respect to legal analysis and interpretation; the analysis is not only
of precedent but also, in more typically judicial mode, of the policy pros and
cons. The result was that the board took advantage of the authority of the
law/compliance frame, without many of the constraints that frame usually
imposes on executive branch officials. Its pronouncement that the telephony
metadata program is illegal, beyond the statutory authority of the
administration, is what got by far the most attention. 254
The PCLOB’s two Republican appointees disagreed with the three
Democrats both on the merits and on the Board’s role. One wrote:
This legal question will be resolved by the courts, not by this
Board, which does not have the benefit of traditional
adversarial legal briefing and is not particularly well-suited
250
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to conducting de novo review of long-standing statutory
interpretations. We are much better equipped to assess
whether this program is sound as a policy matter and whether
changes could be made to better protect Americans’ privacy
and civil liberties while also protecting national security. 255
To be clear, the Democratic PCLOB members also addressed the
policy considerations on their own merits, and urged that those
considerations be implemented as new law. Having described the telephony
metadata program as extending beyond current statutory parameters, the
PCLOB emphasized that the solution was not simply shoring up FISA:
The Board also recommends against the enactment of
legislation that would merely codify the existing program or
any other program that collected bulk data on such a massive
scale regarding individuals with no suspected ties to
terrorism or criminal activity. While new legislation could
provide clear statutory authorization for a program that
currently lacks a sound statutory footing, any new bulk
collection program would still pose grave threats to privacy
and civil liberties. 256
The telephony metadata program was insufficiently central to the
counterterrorism enterprise to justify those threats, the Board argued. “Given
the significant privacy and civil liberties interests at stake, Congress should
seek the least intrusive alternative and should not legislate to the outer
bounds of its authority.” 257 It then proceeded to make several smaller gauge
recommendations about operation of the telephony metadata program,
presumably in case Congress rejected the first recommendation, and
continued the program in existence.
No experience facilitates evaluation of the PCLOB’s effectiveness,
but its 215 report is certainly adding to the current pressure for a new wave
of intelligence reform. On the other hand, the independence exhibited by its
first report may induce subsequent appointing Presidents to choose tamer
members.
The PCLOB’s second report, about targeted surveillance of
foreigners abroad, under FISA § 702, similarly looked at both law and
policy. But on this one, a divide among PCLOB members and inconsistent
255
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language made the message much less clear. Much of Section 702
surveillance was appropriate, the report said. But:
Outside of this fundamental core, certain aspects of the
Section 702 program raise questions about whether its
impact on U.S. persons pushes the program over the edge
into constitutional unreasonableness. Such aspects include
the scope of the incidental collection of U.S. persons’
communications, the use of “about” collection to acquire
Internet communications that are neither to nor from the
target of surveillance, the collection of MCTs that
predictably will include U.S. persons’ Internet
communications unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance,
the use of database queries to search the information
collected under the program for the communications of
specific U.S. persons, and the possible use of
communications acquired under the program for criminal
assessments, investigations, or proceedings that have no
relationship to foreign intelligence. 258
The Board declined to decide whether the 702 program was constitutional,
statutorily authorized, or not. “[R]ather than render a judgment about the
constitutionality of the program as a whole, the Board instead has addressed
the areas of concern it has identified by formulating recommendations for
changes to those aspects of the program.” 259 It elaborated:
Because the same factors that bear on Fourth Amendment
reasonableness under a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test are
equally relevant to an assessment based purely on policy, the
Board opts to present its proposals for changes to the Section
702 program as policy recommendations, without rendering
a judgment about which, if any, of those proposals might be
necessary from a constitutional perspective. 260
The Board emphasized the room this approach opened to it. Constitutional
avoidance, it stated:
permits us to offer the recommendations that we believe are
merited on privacy grounds without making finetuned
determinations about whether any aspect of the status quo is
constitutionally fatal, and without limiting our
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PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 96–97 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB, 702 REPORT],
http://perma.cc/M439-GAKN.
259
Id. at 97.
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But other language the report used sounded rather more accepting. Rather
than ducking the legal issues, on other pages it seemed that the Board was
worried not whether the 702 program crossed the constitutional line, but
whether it skirted a bit too close for comfort, while still remaining on the
lawful side. For example:
[C]ertain aspects of the Section 702 program push the entire
program close to the line of constitutional reasonableness. . .
. With these concerns in mind, this Report offers a set of
policy proposals designed to push the program more
comfortably into the sphere of reasonableness, ensuring that
the program remains tied to its constitutionally legitimate
core.
This reading of the report as ratifying the legality (rather than
declining to address the legality) of the 702 program was pushed by the
Board’s two Republicans, Rachel Brand and Elisebeth Collins Cook, each of
them a former Bush Administration head of the Justice Department’s Office
of Legal Policy. 262 They emphasized in a separate statement that:
The Board makes a few targeted recommendations to address
concerns raised by . . . two aspects of the program. We stress
that these are policy-based recommendations designed to
tighten the program’s operation and ameliorate the extent to
which these aspects of the program could affect the privacy
and civil liberties of U.S. persons. We do not view them to
be essential to the program’s statutory or constitutional
validity. 263
Two members, Chair David Medine and former Judge Patricia Wald,
opined in a separate statement that the recommendations were needed not
merely to avoid a potential legal problem, but to solve both constitutional
and statutory infirmities already extant:
[W]e feel strongly that the present internal agency
procedures for reviewing communications and purging those
portions that are of no foreign intelligence value prior to use
261

Id.
See Biography of Rachel L. Brand--Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, PCLOB, http://perma.cc/F7R9-7VJA (last visited Nov. 17, 2014);
Biography of Elisebeth Collins Cook—Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, PCLOB, http://perma.cc/2VM4-DRZT (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
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of the information are wholly inadequate to protect
Americans’ acknowledged constitutional rights to protection
for private information or to give effect to the statutory
definition of foreign intelligence information, which, as
discussed below, provides a more stringent test for
information relating to Americans. 264

Evidently, however, they were unable to persuade their colleagues, and their
legal conclusions were portrayed in media coverage as a dissent-type
minority position. Indeed, the Board was widely perceived as having blessed
the program. The Washington Post, for example, summarized the report as
“conclud[ing] that a major National Security Agency surveillance program
targeting foreigners overseas is lawful and effective but that certain elements
push ‘close to the line’ of being unconstitutional.” 265 The fairer reading of
the previously-quoted language of the report—that it avoided any
determination on the legal question by an incompletely theorized agreement
as to recommendations—received no play in the media.
The PCLOB’s ten recommendations relating to the 702 program
have not received nearly as much attention as its 215 recommendations—
lacking the strong legitimating language of rights and compliance, its policy
ideas seem not to be gaining much traction.
III. The Liberty Gap
I observe above that American intelligence legalism has three
features: substantive rules, judicial review, and empowerment of lawyers.
These three together promote the compliance mindset that is evident in Part
II—a mindset that at NSA is fairly longstanding, prioritized, and adequately
staffed. Thus far I have offered an organizational account of a concomitant
civil liberties gap: I have demonstrated that few institutional resources
relating to the NSA are devoted to asking the “should” question rather than
the “can” question. But perhaps this is an appropriate allocation of labor.
Perhaps the “should” question belongs outside the NSA, indeed outside the
IC—with the courts, the Congress, or the President. If these “upstream”
actors could harden optimal policy into compliance-ready rules—law—then
there would be no need for additional policy work within the IC. Instead,
intelligence legalism might be the best implementation method.
I suggest in Section A, below, that the law alone is not enough; it is
implausible that constitutional, statutory, and binding executive rules will be
sufficiently robust to produce the best policy outcomes. There will always be
liberty gaps—and these will increase with the passage of time from the last
public outcry and resulting intervention. In Section B, I examine and reject a
264
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different argument that intelligence legalism sufficiently furthers liberty: that
lawyers, empowered by legalism, turn out to be excellent good civil liberties
guardians. Finally, in Section C, I argue that the compliance focus, and the
prevalence of rights and law talk, actually dampens the prospects of civil
liberties policymaking, both by crowding it out and by rendering
surveillance more politically acceptable and therefore making political or
policy-based claims for reform less likely to succeed, whether inside the
Intelligence Community or in the polity as a whole. In sum, intelligence
legalism may further individual liberty to some extent, but compliance
matters are apt to receive so much attention and even prestige that law
functions as a ceiling rather than a floor. To add policy considerations on top
of law thus requires focused intervention, discussed in Part IV.
A. The Limited, Though Important, Reach of Legality
If the Constitution and statutes (both as interpreted by judges), and
binding executive orders—taken together, the law—specify optimal
security/liberty policy, then intelligence legalism might be the best
implementation method for that policy. But I argue this is not the case; the
law is likely to be suboptimal with respect to liberty. More analytic precision
may be useful here. I mean, more exactly, that law is likely to leave
unregulated many situations when (a) liberty can be enhanced without a
negative impact on security, or (b) when enhancing liberty would (or might)
negatively affect security, but on balance the gain to the former is worth the
hit to the latter. 266 Of course, different observers may disagree whether any
particular scenario qualifies under either criterion. My point is that the
limited ambitions of constitutional law and the limited political payoff from
statutory or regulatory enactment of civil liberties protections mean that it is
implausible on any account that the law achieves policy optimality, even for
a brief moment in time. Moreover, even if that were not so, the limits in
coverage of legislative-type rules—which are inevitable, and likely to grow
over time—inevitably mean that there is space between the standard of
“liberty where there’s no, or acceptable, security cost” and the complianceready rules.
1. The Constitution
Consider, first, the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts. Those
who answer charges of surveillance overreach by emphasizing the
constitutionality of the contested conduct—which is to say, nearly every
federal official who has defended the NSA in recent months—are essentially
arguing that constitutional law sets not individual rights minima, but rather,
perhaps even definitionally, the right civil liberties policy. If this were
266

One way to put this is that law is unlikely to place us on the “security-liberty frontier,” as
defined in ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007).

174

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 6

correct, optimal policy could be implemented by a robust compliance
infrastructure. The best civil liberties path might, for example, be simply to
augment judicial review, perhaps by cutting through the large variety of
litigation barriers (including doctrines of ripeness, finality, standing,
justiciability, state secrets, and limits on inferred private rights of action) that
often impede judicial supervision.
The problem is that to assume, as this view does, that
“constitutional” and “good” are the same is to mistake the role of
constitutional law. 267 The distance between “constitutional” and “good” is a
matter of both method and purpose. Methodologically, many of the
constitutional considerations—precedent, text, framers’ intent, and so on—
are irrelevant to policy evaluation. Courts may well also “lack the
institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications of new
technologies they encounter,” as Orin Kerr has argued at length. 268 But even
when courts include policy analysis in their decision-making, constitutional
decisions at least purport to be more about “can” than about “should.” That
is why Fourth Amendment caselaw, notwithstanding its policy-heavy
reasonableness inquiry, is formulated to give the government a good deal of
leeway269—both for mistakes 270 and for differences of opinion. 271 Indeed, it
is only to be expected that courts are likely to err on the side of nonintervention in constitutional cases. The remedial rigor that is at least the
symbolic entailment of a right must on the margin discourage rights
declaration 272 ; declaring something to be a “right” ups the stakes
considerably, discouraging partial solutions.
267

See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 831 (2004) (“These cases suggest
that courts generally do not engage in creative normative inquiries into privacy and
technological change when applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies.”).
268
Id. at 858, 857–887. For more pro-court discussions of the institutional issues, see, e.g.,
David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, (forthcoming U. Chi. L. Rev.), http://perma.cc/45VD-3L3E; Erin Murphy, The
Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, The Fourth
Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485 (2013).
269
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 267, at 838 (“[U]nderstood as a whole, the existing body of
doctrine reflects a relatively humble and deferential judicial attitude.”).
270
See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (Fourth Amendment rules
“seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because
many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or
less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.”); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386,396 (1989) (“[R]easonableness . . . must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.”).
271
See, e.g., Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (“the choice
among . . . reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite
number of police officers”).
272
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 884-885 (1999) (describing this relationship between rights and remedies as “remedial
deterrence,” whose “defining feature is the threat of undesirable remedial consequences
motivating courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those consequences”).
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So while constitutional law and court enforcement of it sometimes
advance individual liberty with respect to particular issue or in some cases,
there is likely to be considerable distance between optimal policy and the
constitutional floor. To quote one summary, again by Orin Kerr, “we should
not expect the Fourth Amendment alone to provide adequate protections
against invasions of privacy made possible by law enforcement use of new
technologies. . . . Additional privacy protections are needed to fill the gap
between the protections that a reasonable person might want and what the
Fourth Amendment actually provides.” 273
This position is not without its high-profile detractors. Most recently,
many in the George W. Bush administration took the stance that it was
generally advisable to “act to the edges of the law.” 274 Accordingly, Jack
Goldsmith recounts, “[a] White House confident about what it wanted to do
. . . used lawyers, and especially legal opinions by OLC lawyers, as a sword
to silence of discipline a recalcitrant bureaucracy.” 275 But for the reasons just
explained, the approach in question—call it the “chalk on the cleats”
attitude—systematically fails to subject particular policies to actual merits
analysis. To quote Goldsmith again, “It got policies wrong, ironically,
because it was excessively legalistic, because it often substituted legal
analysis for political judgment, and because it was too committed to
expanding the President’s constitutional powers.” 276
The Bush White House’s ideas notwithstanding, the position that
“constitutional” and “good” may have quite a distance between them has
mostly been uncontroversial in the world of intelligence. FISA itself imposes
a statutory warrant requirement—one that the Supreme Court has never held
is constitutionally required. In the Keith case, the Supreme Court held that
domestic national security surveillance required a warrant, but expressly
declined to examine “the issues which may be involved with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents.” 277 The Court expressly invited
legislation:
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the
latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified
crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible
with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in
relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence
information and the protected rights of our citizens. 278
273
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FISA’s passage was spurred in part by the Keith opinion’s implicit threat
that, absent some kind of institutionalized framework to safeguard
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court might subsequently hold that
Katz’s warrant requirement for electronic eavesdropping covers foreign
intelligence surveillance of domestic communications. 279 But it was also
prompted by an emerging view in the lower courts that warrants would not
be required. 280 As Laura Donohue summarizes in a comprehensive
forthcoming article about FISA Section 702, “Congress crafted the
legislation to ensure that domestic electronic foreign intelligence collection
could not proceed absent prior judicial review, demonstration of probable
cause, and particularity.” 281 When Congress took the Court’s invitation and
legislated, requiring warrants for foreign intelligence surveillance at home
(but leaving regulation of surveillance abroad for another day 282), it therefore
went beyond existing caselaw.
Even if one interprets FISA as implementing a constitutionally
compelled framework, albeit one never articulated by a court, 283 it is clear
that for many other topics in intelligence policy our current understanding of
appropriate conduct is extra-constitutional. On issue after issue, for example,
the Church Committee declined to rest on the Constitution (about which, it
279

See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 36, 409 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (“Mr.
Speaker, it has now been over 6 years since the Supreme Court in the famous Kieth [sic]
case cast a cloud over current warrantless procedures for foreign intelligence surveillance. . .
. Finally, after years of work by four congressional committees and two administrations, we
have developed a bill. . . .”).
280
For cases upholding pre-FISA warrantless surveillance under a “foreign intelligence
exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, see United States v. Brown,
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602 n.32, 605 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.; Ivanov v.
United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1980). Coming
out the other way (albeit in dicta) was Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618-20 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc, Skelly Wright, J.) (plurality opinion suggesting that a warrant may be
required even in a foreign intelligence investigation), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). For
liberals in Congress, the possibility that the Supreme Court’s threat might evaporate
provided additional reason to legislate.
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Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and
Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2015).
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H. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 51 (June 5, 1978) (“The fact that this bill does not bring the
overseas surveillance activities of the U.S. intelligence community within its purview,
however, should not be viewed as congressional authorization of such activities as they
affect the privacy interests of Americans. The committee merely recognizes at this point that
such overseas surveillance activities are not covered by this bill.”).
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Donohue, for example, labels the result a “de facto Fourth Amendment standard.”
Donohue, supra note 281, at 111. The shape of any foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant requirement was for decades mooted by FISA, but is being litigated again as a result
of 702 surveillance (and its predecessor surveillance under the Protect American Act). See
In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d 1004, 1010 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); [Caption Redacted] 2011WL 10945618, at 24 (FISA
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475, 2014 WL 2866749 (D.
Ore. June 24, 2014).
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must have mattered, Senators’ views are not dispositive). Instead, the
Committee proposed a large number of new substantive rules; this included
not only rules eventually incorporated in FISA 284 but also rules against
assassination of foreign leaders; 285 use of academics for CIA operations
without disclosure to their university presidents; 286 non-public sponsorship
of books, articles, etc. by the CIA; 287 CIA relationships with journalists
affiliated with U.S. media organizations, or with American clergy; 288
dangerous and unconsented human drug experimentation; 289 and so on.
These recommendations constituted the Committee’s views not of what was
already legally required, but what should be required. Implementation then
took place via E.O. 12,333.
2. Statutory Law
So there has long been agreement that the Constitution alone is
insufficient to achieve optimal civil liberties protections with respect to
surveillance. What about non-constitutional law? Are the statutes that have
been passed sufficient? Or, even if they are not, might new statutory law—
which can then be implemented via intelligence legalism—be the best way
to fill the gap that remains after constitutional adjudication?
Start with the small subset of the Church Committee’s proposed
reforms implemented by FISA. The statutory text imposes a probable cause
requirement for domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, as
the Supreme Court hinted in the Keith case it might someday require as a
matter of constitutional law. FISA’s other contributions are procedural rather
than substantive. I have suggested that optimal policy requires calibration of
privacy and surveillance—that surveillance should be conducted only when
its security benefits outweigh its privacy infringement. FISA includes no
such constraint. Rather, to the extent surveillance requires an invasion of
U.S. person privacy, FISA allows that invasion to occur, directing
implementation to “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons” only insofar as such minimization is
“consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information.” 290 Thus FISA categorically
gives security more weight than liberty; its text directs that any foreign
intelligence “need” trumps privacy.
284
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You may be thinking that the Congress that enacted FISA chose a
thumb on the scale for security because it disagreed with me on the merits,
believing that FISA’s trump card for security constituted optimal policy.
That is, perhaps the 1978 Congress saw FISA as closing whatever civil
liberties gap there was. The historical record suggests otherwise, however.
Reformers in the 1970s made clear that they didn’t intend for congressional
protection of civil liberties against surveillance to end with FISA. Rather, the
Church Committee’s view was on top of FISA itself,
executive/congressional disclosure would both minimize the future use of
liberty-infringing techniques and facilitate future interventions The
Committee made formal findings that Congressional dereliction of oversight
responsibilities had “helped shape the environment in which improper
intelligence activities were possible.” 291 Accordingly, it explained:
Procedural safeguards—“auxiliary precautions” as they were
characterized in the Federalist Papers—must be adopted
along with substantive restraints. . . . Our proposed
procedural checks range from judicial review of intelligence
activity before or after the fact to formal and high level
Executive branch approval and more effective Congressional
oversight. 292
Committee members (Senators) evidently believed that the congressional
disclosure it urged would facilitate liberty as well as accountability, allowing
future lawmakers to intervene where salutary, using either soft or hard
methods, to appropriately balance liberty and security. As Loch Johnson—
first Senator Church’s special assistant, then the first staff director of the
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight, and then an intelligence
scholar—has summarized, “The purpose of these new arrangements was to
prevent a further erosion of American liberties at the hands of the
intelligence agencies.” 293
Congressional disclosure has not in practice fulfilled these hopes.
New disclosure norms have indeed shifted information, power, and political
risk to the White House and the Congress 294 (although the mandate,
291

II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 278.
Id. at 293 (citing Madison, Federalist 51 “If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would he necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”).
293
Loch K. Johnson, Establishment of Modern Intelligence Accountability, in U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO
THE WAR ON TERROR 37, 42 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2008).
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operative since 1980, that the Intelligence Community “keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities, other than a covert action” 295 has not always been
scrupulously honored). But obstacles to development of legislative expertise
and the ordinarily low political salience of intelligence—both themselves
rooted in secrecy—have meant that congressional interventions have not
played much of a civil-liberties-protective role. 296 Only once, in 1994, has a
statute unambiguously increased procedural protections against
surveillance—and that amendment was passed in large part to shore up
executive authority. 297 By contrast, the executive branch has been able,
several times, to elicit congressional acquiescence for statutes to expand
surveillance authority—the USA PATRIOT Act, the Protect America Act,

AFFAIRS 93 (2008); Loch K. Johnson, The CIA and the Question of Accountability, 12
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 178 (2014). I do not mean to take much of a
position on the longstanding argument about whether the current degree of legislative
oversight is adequate, only to argue that intelligence oversight reform promoted disclosure
as one of its principal reforms, and has succeeded in achieving, at least, more such
disclosure.
295
National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1) (1947). This provision was inserted into
the Act by Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(a), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980).
296
Others have written at length about the institutional dynamics that undermine effective
congressional intelligence oversight, not just of civil liberties but of intelligence policy more
generally. As Amy Zegart summarizes her own findings:
Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in
intelligence oversight for a very long time. Two institutional weaknesses
are paramount: rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the
development of legislative expertise in intelligence, and committee
jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress’s budgetary
power over executive branch intelligence agencies. . . . Ten years after
9/11, the United States has an intelligence oversight system that is welldesigned to serve the re-election interests of individual legislators and
protect congressional committee prerogatives, but poorly designed to
serve the national interest.
AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY 10–11 (2011). See also, e.g., L. BRITT SNYDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL:
CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS 1946–2004 (2008); Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right
to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (2011) (observing that
congressional oversight has frequently been hobbled by administration insistence that
information be shared only with members, not their staff, even staff with appropriate
security clearances).
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Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-359
(1994), 108 Stat. 3454, Sec. 9 (authorizing FISA judges to allow secret physical searches
within the United States of “the premises, property, information, or material of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence
information”); this amendment to FISA substituted FISA Court process for the prior (rare)
practice of Attorney General authorization of such searches. See MCGEE & DUFFY, MAIN
JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 342–343; Warrantless Physical Searches Conducted in the U.S.
for Foreign Service: Statement before the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence H.R.
(July 14, 1994), http://perma.cc/8D4G-7G2Z (statement of Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy
Attorney General).
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and the FISA Amendments Act. 298 (The last of these included some
protections along with the expansion of authority. 299) It is possible that the
Snowden disclosures have shifted the political economy enough for
Congress to pass a rights-protective measure in response, but the current
prospects of serious legislated reform are dim and getting dimmer. 300 .
Thus whatever the Church Committee’s ambitions or expectations
for their congressional successors, congressional disclosure has increased
intelligence accountability but has not so far provided an impetus for
responsive additional civil liberties protections. The civil liberties gap left by
the limited ambit of constitutional law, and of FISA, remains. Present efforts
in Congress to update the surveillance rules to be more liberty-protective in
the era of big data may succeed and align “can” with the reformers’ ideas
about “should”—for a while and for high-salience issues. But even if this
happens, it is inevitable that for issues that have not made it into the press, or
for issues in the future, there will always be a disjunction between what is
legal and what even members of Congress themselves would find to be, on
full and public consideration, appropriate policy. Areas of surveillance
practice that have not so far leaked—or in which executive practice
changes—will remain, and so, concomitantly, will at least some civil
liberties gap.
3. Executive Order
Efforts to implement most of the Church Committee’s substantive
recommendations as statutory law failed; they entered American law instead
as part of Executive Order 12,333. As already quoted, the Executive Order
does expressly state (in language unchanged from its 1981 promulgation):
“Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and
consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance
between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual
interests.” 301 That is, one of 12,333’s purposes is to fill the civil liberties gap
left by constitutional and statutory law.
But 12,333 cannot live up to that goal. For one thing, the rules’ status
as part of an executive order renders them both less visible and more easily
weakened. The 2008 amendments to 12,333, for example, for the first time
allowed inter-agency sharing of signals intelligence “for purposes of
allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is
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USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 272 Stat. 115 (2001); Protect America Act,
Pub. L. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007); FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 2436
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See Spencer Ackerman, Senate Republicans Block USA Freedom Act Surveillance
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relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it,” pursuant to
potential “procedures established by the Director in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense and approved by the Attorney General.” 302 This change
received no attention by non-governmental commentators. 303
More important, even if Executive Order 12,333 adequately covered
civil liberties interests in 1980, it—along with its associated AG
Guidelines—has grown out-of-date in subsequent decades. Unsurprisingly,
given the generally low visibility of intelligence matters, there was little
appetite to update either Executive Order 12,333 or other sources of
executive self-regulation to address new challenges to liberty, until the
Snowden disclosures. Thus notwithstanding the enormous changes that have
taken place in the scope of surveillance since 1980 and the advent of “big
data” methods, there have been no substantive liberty-protective changes
ever made to the Executive Order. Some procedural protections have been
added, 304 and notable efforts to weaken the protection of U.S. Person
information were fended off. 305 But whatever further substantive protection
might be useful in light of technological or other changes, all that has been
added since 1980 is new hortatory language swearing fealty to (already
binding) other laws: “The United States Government has a solemn
obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under
this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons,
including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal
law.” 306
Of course, in the rare situation of important disclosures, public
discontent about surveillance practices might prompt the President to update
Executive Order 12,333, as public discontent has occasionally prompted
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other policies that back away from the edge of lawfulness. 307 Indeed, the
January 17 promulgation of PPD-28 is a step in this direction. In addition to
directing the development of policies to give foreigners some of the same
protections already available to U.S. persons, 308 PPD-28 includes some new
civil liberties—and even civil rights—protective language:
“Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in
the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The
United States shall not collect signals intelligence for the
purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or
for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion.” 309
“Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as
feasible.” 310
“In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be
used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or
dissent [or] disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity,
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion . . . .” 311
PPD-28’s new language related to “purpose” is limited in its bite (like any
sole purpose requirement). It is, however, susceptible to implementation
under a compliance framework. One can imagine a compliance regime that
requires documentation and audit of the purpose of SIGINT collection, or of
the use of information collected in bulk, to ensure that those purposes are not
“suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent,” or “disadvantaging persons
based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.” But
the other language quoted above reveals a very different, supplemental,
approach. Making “privacy and civil liberties . . . integral considerations in
the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities,” and ensuring that
“[s]ignals intelligence activities . . . [are] as tailored as feasible” are not
compliance tasks; they are policy tasks. PPD-28, like several other recent
reform proposals, is thus adding to the existing intelligence legalism regime
a distinct concept of non-legalistic internal bureaucratic measures—a libertyprotective infrastructure that can put civil liberties concerns into the policy
mix, asking the “should” question. This is a new development. Previously,
the compliance mindset within the Executive branch has failed to
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encourage—and even discouraged—policy-based consideration of civil
liberties, for reasons I now explore.
B. Lawyers Are Not Civil Libertarians
Within a particular organization such as the NSA, the impact of a
rights and compliance frame is to allocate decision-making to lawyers. If
those lawyers have a civil libertarian orientation, this could be a channel by
which rights and compliance serve civil liberties interests. That is, one could
imagine that agency lawyers might systematically exercise a pro-liberty
orientation, which could fill gaps that might otherwise exist. However,
multiplying accounts of lawyers in the Intelligence Community suggest
otherwise. A growing shelf-full of articles and books document and even
celebrate the lawyers who now populate the military, the CIA, and the
Department of Justice’s National Security Division. Jack Goldsmith, for
example, has labeled these lawyers a key part of “something new and
remarkable,” describing “giant distributed networks of lawyers,
investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that
rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than
ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large,
against them.” 312 Might all these lawyers push the intelligence enterprise
towards appropriate balancing of liberty and security, even in the absence of
specific law or doctrine declaring the required outcome?
I think not. Rather, when lawyers (in an office where they are
understood to be practicing law) are given policy roles, those lawyers’ legal
sign-off frequently stands in as sufficient justification to undertake the
policy. To quote Goldsmith one last time, describing the Bush
administration’s aggressive stance on a variety of national security topics,
the role of lawyers was part of why “‘What should we do?’ . . . often
collapsed into ‘What can we lawfully do?’” 313 The emerging evidence
suggests that national security agency counsel are implementers of two
major sets of values—fiduciary/counselor, and rule of law—but not civil
liberties. Judge James E. Baker’s book-long defense and explication of the
role of lawyers in the national security state barely mentions the key civil
liberties values of freedom of speech or religion, the right to travel, or due
process, but repeatedly emphasizes the centrality of building “a society and a
government bound by law, and respect for law.” 314 Consider one last time
that 2005 speech to the NSA’s lawyers and their colleagues, by then-Deputy
Attorney General James Comey, in which he praised the NSA’s lawyers as
“custodian[s] of our constitution and the rule of law.” Comey did not exhort
his audience of intelligence lawyers to ask the “should” question, rather than
312
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the “can” question. Rather, the commitment he attempted to bolster was to
legal compliance, not to individual liberty. To quote his revealing phrase
again, he pleaded for “‘yes’ when it can be, . . . ‘no’ when it must be.” 315
And as I pointed out in this article’s introduction, the “no’s” Comey
praises may make remarkably little difference, in the end. The hospital-bed
confrontation leading to the brief shut-down of part of the “President’s
Surveillance Program”—the modern ur-episode of intelligence legalism—is
a perfect case in point. Lawyers, it seems to me, are far more likely to move
an organization towards this kind of nearly symbolic compliance than to
effect any more significant constraint on executive activity, particularly with
respect to a program important to the President. Indeed, lawyers are
attractive to intelligence organizations because they are simultaneously able
to give agency operations an imprimatur of lawfulness and to maintain their
agency affiliation/loyalty. 316 Their occasional “no’s,” which like as not have
formal rather than major substantive effects, are a price worth paying for
those traits.
C. The Costs of Intelligence Legalism
Theorists and observers in a variety of fields have developed the
broad critique that law and its concomitant rights orientation may have the
counterintuitive impact of decreasing the welfare of the purported rights
holders—or, in a more modest version of the point, may ameliorate some
prevalent set of harms but undermine more ambitious efforts. Focusing
particularly on litigation, they argue that it is inherently a timid enterprise,
and yet it crowds out other more muscular approaches. 317 Even with respect
to out-of-court rights orientation, or “legalization,” scholars have offered the
insight that formalizing/legalistic approaches can come with real costs to
their intended beneficiaries, depending on the context. 318 The issue is
315
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whether, in a particular institutional setting, these possibilities have
materialized. In this Section, I examine two pathways by which intelligence
legalism tends to impair the prospects of a softer civil-liberties protective
policy.
1. Intelligence Legalism Crowds Out Interest Balancing
This Article demonstrates the high salience of rights in this realm.
Several related mechanisms convert that high salience into a devaluation of
interests:
First, rights occupy the “liberty” field because of the practical issue
of attention bandwidth, which potentially applies both to agencies and
advocates. After all, even large organizations have limited capacity. 319 NSA
compliance is such an enormous task that little room remains for more
conceptual weighing of interests and options. Recall that of the dozen-plus
offices I described in Part II, just two—the Civil Liberties and Privacy
Office at the NSA, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—are
currently playing a policy rather than strictly a compliance role. They are
also, not coincidentally, the two newest and two smallest of the offices
listed.
I think, though, that this bandwidth issue is driven by a more
conceptual, less practical, factor: that rights talk hides the necessity of policy
judgments and, by its purity, diverts attention from that messier field.
Morton Horwitz explains the point:
A . . . troubling aspect of rights discourse is that its focus on
fundamental, inherent, inalienable or natural rights is a way
of obscuring or distorting the reality of the social
construction of rights and duties. It shifts discussion away
from the always disputable issue of what is or is not socially
desirable. Rights discourse . . . wishes us to believe instead
that the recognition of rights is not a question of social
choice at all, as if in the normative and constitutional realm
rights have the same force as the law of gravity. 320
in particular professional advocates. But very few recipients have the knowledge and
resources of professional advocates and only a few more are able to get representation by
professional advocates. For the rest, formalization and bureaucratization have in many ways
decreased accessibility and responsiveness.”).
319
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Mary Dudziak makes a similar claim in her recent discussion of law and
drone warfare, “In this context, law . . . does not aid judgment, but diverts
our attention from morality, diplomacy, humanity, and responsibility in the
use of force, and especially from the bloody mess left on the ground.” 321
Even in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, an area of constitutional
doctrine explicitly imbued with policy considerations, we talk about rights as
if they are somehow scientific, to be deduced rather than debated. The
discussion that must accompany policy claims pales in prestige and
importance by comparison. And from the perspective of their beneficiaries,
judicially enforceable rights, with their promise of supremacy over
competing interests, are shiny and magnetic. This is why the assertion of
rights can be such a powerful organizing tool 322—even if those rights don’t
turn out to change much on the ground. As Rich Ford has written, “Rights
are a secular religion for many Americans.” 323 Or to quote Alan Freeman’s
classic article about civil rights, “Rights consciousness can offer sustenance
to a political movement, however alienated, indeterminate or reified rights
may be.” 324
It is the purity, the apparent apolitical nature, of rights that makes
them nearly the only coin available. By comparison with judicially
enforceable rights, other methods of advancing individual liberty look
feeble, contingent, jury-rigged. An accusation of illegality becomes the
required first bid for any policy discussion, and a refutation of that
accusation ends play. This dynamic is very much in evidence in the response
to the PCLOB’s 702 report, described above. Rights discourse stunts needed
policy discourse. 325
2. Intelligence Legalism and Legitimation
In addition, judicial review legitimates the American surveillance
system; that is why reference to court supervision is surveillance proponents’
first recourse when they want to suggest that everything is fine. It is, for
example, a rare speech by a government official that fails to make reference
to the FISA Court and its ratification of the government’s surveillance
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programs. Below are passages, chosen essentially at random, from a speech
by President Obama on the topic of signals intelligence reform 326:
•

•

“I ordered that our programs be reviewed by my national
security team and our lawyers . . . . We increased oversight and
auditing, including new structures aimed at compliance.
Improved rules were proposed by the government and approved
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”
“[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . provides
judicial review of some of our most sensitive intelligence
activities.”

In language like the above, court involvement is offered as evidence of both
legality and appropriateness; indeed, the two are conceptually merged.
My point is not that FISA Court legitimation is phony. In fact,
judicial review has real effects on the system—we know from the recently
declassified documents that FISA Court review disciplines the surveillance
system, holding it at least to the government’s own representations. 327 Yet
the oversight gain carries with it a legitimation cost; the existence of judicial
review makes political change more difficult. Scholars, particularly critical
legal studies scholars, have made this point in a large number of other
contexts. For example, Alan Freeman argued that civil rights law—and law
more generally—exists “largely to legitimize the existing social
structure.” 328 The polity at large is soothed, and the effect is felt even by
rights beneficiaries, who frame and tame their aspirations to suit the
inherently limited scope of potential judicial interventions. Freeman
described his view that American civil rights litigation has amounted to a
“process of containing and stabilizing the aspirations of the oppressed
through tokenism and formal gestures which actually enhance the material
lives of few.” 329 He wrote:
Rights are granted to, or bestowed upon, the powerless by
the powerful. They are ultimately within the control of those
with authority to interpret or rewrite the sacred texts from
which they derive. To enjoy them, one must respect the
forms and norms laid down by those in power. One must
especially avoid excesses in behavior or demands. 330
326
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The point is not, for Freeman (and the plentiful literature he
adduced), that law accomplishes nothing for its purported beneficiaries. If
that were true, it could not legitimate: “[I]f law is to serve its legitimation
function, [the] ultimate constraints [that come from politics] must yield up
just enough autonomy to the legal system to make its operations credible for
those whose allegiance it seeks as well as those whose self-interest it
rationalizes.” 331 But gains from rights may—and in the surveillance situation
clearly do—make gains from politics less available.
To sum up this Part, neither the Constitution nor FISA aims to
optimally balance security and liberty—and frequently analyzed difficulties
in congressional intelligence oversight mean that new statutes are unlikely to
fill that gap. Likewise the existing foundational Executive Order, 12,333, is
at the very least out-of-date. Accordingly intelligence legalism, and its
compliance mindset, cannot achieve optimal policy. Its concomitant
empowerment of lawyers is real and important, but does not deputize a procivil liberties force. Indeed, legalism actually both crowds out the
consideration of policy and interests (as opposed to law and rights), and
legitimates the surveillance state, making it less susceptible to policy reform.
Are there, then, non-legalistic reforms that could play a productive part? I
turn next to this issue.
IV. Reforms
Since the Guardian’s PRISM story in June 2013, dozens of specific
reforms have been proposed for the NSA and the FISA court. Bill after bill
was introduced in the Congress; though none were enacted, one even passed
in the House. 332 The President appointed a blue-ribbon “Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies,” which after just five
months of work offered him 46 recommendations. 333 The Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board issued its first two reports, with 22
recommendations between them. 334 Advocacy organizations have weighed
in, as have blogging scholars, former government officials, and journalists
and newspaper editorial boards. The President himself has responded by
331
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announcing a number of reforms, and a process to evaluate others, as well as
promulgating a significant new Presidential Policy Directive.
The reforms proposed and announced nearly all cluster into one or
more of eight categories:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deepen surveillance legalism and skepticism towards bulk or
wholesale data collection, by eliminating it, or in the alternative
by imposing more court oversight, tighter government access to
surveillance results, more-individuated showings of need. 335
Increase public disclosure. 336
Raise the level of governmental review for a variety of sensitive
decisions. 337
Treat foreigners abroad more like (but not just like) U.S.
persons. 338
Shrink the NSA’s ambit and perhaps even demilitarize it
somewhat. 339
Support global internet openness and security. 340
Improve personnel and network security. 341
Create/strengthen governmental offices and procedures directed
at privacy and civil liberties. 342

Much of the reform action is, and should be, devoted to substantive
interventions. Congress should itself ask the “should” question, and can
insist on, for example, tighter rules governing bulk collection, requiring
more-individuated justifications for data acquisition, analysis, and use. Or to
rephrase the point using the familiar vocabulary of rules and standards, 343
335
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Congress, and the President, can design and promulgate new rules to serve
the overarching standard—that liberty should be prioritized where it carries
no, or acceptable, cost to security—and these rules can then be enforced by a
compliance regime.
But what about implementation of the underlying standard itself: the
idea that liberty should be prioritized where it carries no, or acceptable, cost
to security? I argued in Part III that surveillance secrecy and the very
significant changes over time mean that some opportunities to further that
standard are likely to remain untouched by the Constitution, statutes, and
executive order. So while I am far from opposed to additional statutory and
regulatory-type rules, there remains an additional opportunity to further
individual liberty and privacy with less legalistic, more standard-like
interventions. This opportunity is the thrust of the last category of reforms,
which propose to institutionalize within the Executive branch, the question
of “should” rather than “can”:
•

•

•

344
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protective of privacy and civil liberties. 350 NSA’s new Civil
Liberties and Privacy Office is working through how to conduct
assessments along these lines. 351
The President’s Review Group also recommended that “program
reviews” be instituted, external to the IC elements in question,
“to assess and respond to emerging privacy and civil liberties
issues”; these might be done by the PCLOB or some other
way. 352 The USA Freedom Act, the leading reform bill—which
though it died in the Senate, will likely be the starting point for
any congressional intervention in 2015—would have required
the Intelligence Community Inspector General to do a similar
kind of review. 353
A reform proposal endorsed by nearly everyone 354 (with some
cavil by former FISA presiding Judge John Bates 355) is to adjust
FISA proceedings by introducing some kind of public advocate
with a systematic role. In the President’s Review Group
formulation: create a “Public Interest Advocate to represent
privacy and civil liberties interests” in the FISA Court, allowing
the Court to invite participation, but also allowing the Advocate
to “intervene on her own initiative.” 356 The President agreed,
“calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of
advocates from outside government to provide an independent
voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.” 357 This was included in the Senate version
of the USA Freedom Act. 358
The PCLOB, in its report on 702 surveillance, urged the
government to “develop a comprehensive methodology for
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assessing the efficacy and relative value of counterterrorism
programs,” in order to effectively weigh the interests of the
government in conducting a program against the intrusions on
privacy and civil liberties that it may cause.” 359

Each of these proposals would designate either an office, person, or
process to prioritize privacy and civil liberties—values that, as we have seen,
otherwise lack advocates within the NSA’s governance structure. So might
they really change anything at the NSA? I next look at three new/proposed
offices.
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug
the messiness of civil liberties protections—the policy issues that lie at the
core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what
follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if
messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described
below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft
administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well
worth trying by a principal—whether that principal is the President or the
Congress—who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the
institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of
these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more
systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more
liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth
emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just
cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties
cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of
ways. 360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices
like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil
liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress
in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more
congressional attention. 361 And in several different ways, they may increase
public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on
those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports—both public and
private—which can be used by Congress and the public. 362 And they build
relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased
official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all
359
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for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a
complicated ecology.
A. NSA Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy
I describe the NSA’s new Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy above
in Section II.A. Here I ask what steps might maximize the chances that the
office could succeed, or at least make a real impact. The twin dangers of
impotence and capture/assimilation threaten all such Offices of Goodness. 363
The extraordinarily high stakes of counterterrorism work increase both
dangers at NSA: nobody wants to be the person whose prioritization of
liberty led to someone’s death. And yet both could be ameliorated by certain
organizational choices:
1. Maintaining Influence
Any internal office whose mission is to constrain its agency runs the
risk of losing influence and being ignored, whether by being excluded from
working groups and processes or by having its attempted contributions
rebuffed. This dynamic might be particularly strong at the NSA, because
internal actors have up until now identified compliance problems as the
threat to privacy/civil liberties. If the NSA’s new civil liberties office is
going to add anything distinctive, it will need to embrace interests rather
than rights, policy rather than compliance. But as discussed above, the
attraction of the compliance frame is the legitimation it provides. When the
new office takes on policy tasks, lacking that legitimation, it will be
especially bureaucratically vulnerable to being frozen out.
Moreover, many of the tools usually available to an Office of
Goodness to augment its own influence will be unavailable because of the
secrecy that surrounds NSA activities. In many circumstances an Office of
Goodness asked to publicly ratify particular agency choices (activities,
approaches, rules) can pressure agency leadership into making, or shading,
certain choices in exchange for that ratification. But the NSA civil liberties
office will often be unable to provide publicly-visible ratification, because
the programs in question are secret. Accordingly, office leadership will lack
that pressure point. Offices of Goodness can often cultivate external
advocacy organization support, but the NSA civil liberties office’s access to
this tool is similarly undermined by secrecy. Offices of Goodness can gain
influence by generating documents that then become public, whether
because they are officially released, leaked, or turned over because of a
Freedom of Information Act or litigation discovery request. But in the
classified environment these avenues of communication, too, are extremely
narrow, which means that agency flouting of office views is less costly than
363
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it would otherwise be. 364 All three of the strategies just mentioned rely on a
public constituency to bolster an Office of Goodness’s influence—because,
as James Q. Wilson summarizes, for federal agencies, “[t]he principal source
of power is a constituency.” 365 The NSA civil liberties office will have a
public constituency, but secrecy cannot but undermine how much help that
constituency can provide.
So in order to remain empowered, the NSA civil liberties office will
need to cultivate alternative allies, with security clearances—at ODNI, DOJ,
at the White House, and in Congress. I imagine this too will be a challenge.
Beginning with ODNI and DOJ, the most obvious potential sources of
support will be from those agencies’ Civil Liberties and Privacy Officers.
But neither is able to carry much water. The ODNI civil liberties office, as
already described, has chosen to function more as a compliance-type than a
policy office. At DOJ, the Civil Liberties and Privacy Office lacks influence
over foreign intelligence matters, which are allocated instead to the National
Security Division. Indeed, no list of relevant offices or proposal of potential
actors to increase oversight of which I’m aware have even mentioned this
office. 366 And the National Security Division lawyers are so committed to
intelligence legalism, so firmly embedded in a compliance system, that they
are unlikely to be very sympathetic to policy arguments that the government
could but should not undertake some step or activity. Besides, a policy
orientation would reduce NSD’s influence. Congress is also a somewhat
hopeful prospect. But an NSA civil liberties office is unlikely to lean far
enough to the left to hold the support of the most vocal congressional critics
of the NSA. And yet the most conservative members of the Intelligence
Committees are not natural allies either. In addition, all the obstacles to
sustained congressional attention to and oversight of intelligence, discussed
above, must obstruct fine-gauge interventions that might be useful to the
office’s influence. In short, the new NSA civil liberties office will be hard
pressed to cement the alliances on which, like every Office of Goodness, it
will depend for influence. (I discuss the possibility of a White House
alliance in the next section.)
The institutional design of the new office should take account of
these difficulties in gaining a constituency or allies. The office’s mandate
364
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from the NSA’s director should include a stable set of situations in which it
can have access to the policy making process, and opportunity to participate,
without needing sharper elbows than it is likely to have. The President’s
Review Group’s recommendations about impact assessments are helpful,
even vital, in this regard and should, in fact, be substantially expanded. The
Review Group report explains that the kind of impact assessment it proposes
“should be broader and more policy-based that has usually been the case for
PIAs [Privacy Impact Assessments]. For instance, policy officials should
explicitly consider the costs and benefits of a program if it unexpectedly
becomes public.” 367 But the recommendation covers only “the broader
programs that may constitute multiple systems.” For impact assessments 368
to play the role I am sketching of bolstering the access and influence of an
NSA civil liberties office, they would need to be required for more
programs.
Other types of institutionalized access might also assist. For example,
perhaps the operational offices could be required to report every year to the
new civil liberties office how, precisely, each type of surveillance authority
that touches U.S. persons has contributed to the NSA’s foreign intelligence
mission—intelligence requirements satisfied, leads generated, etc. The office
could use those reports to do an annual assessment for the NSA’s director of
costs and benefits of the various programs. Certainly, one would want to
ensure that the new office receives notice and an opportunity to comment 369
on all operational changes that potentially impact privacy or civil liberties—
that is, that sweep in more data or data for more people, particularly U.S.
persons. Institutionalizing these processes—impact assessments, annual
reports, clearance inclusion—would protect the new office’s access, a
prerequisite to influence if not influence itself. That would further legitimate
its inquiries and its recommendation role, protecting it from the accusation
of self-aggrandizement or what a lawyer might call “officious
intermeddling.”
There is a danger to all this access, however. The more involvement
in decisionmaking the new NSA civil liberties office has—at both staff and
leadership levels—the more pressure it will receive to go along, to ratify
whatever it is that the operational staff is requesting. Suppose, for example,
the NSA civil liberties officer has the power to non-concur in some situation
and have that non-concurrence push the issue to NSA’s director for decision.
Forcing the director to choose between what his operational staff and his
civil liberties staff propose is putting him in a no-win situation; the pressure
to avoid that will be intense. What counters that pressure, if anything, is the
new official’s commitment to her assigned values, privacy and civil liberties.
I now move to this topic.
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2. Maintaining Commitment
The NSA’s civil liberties office will be able to bolster civil liberties
only if its leader and staff stay committed to this “precarious value,” 370
notwithstanding the value’s oppositional nature within the NSA.
Maintaining commitment means resisting both collegial and careerist
pressures, both born of normal desires to get along with colleagues and to
earn their approbation. The goal is to avoid a special kind of “capture”—not,
as the term usually indicates, by outsiders, but by colleagues. What is needed
are careful and multi-pronged efforts to tie NSA civil liberties staff to a
professional privacy and civil liberties community that can serve as a highly
salient reference group; this should use a combination of hiring, networking,
and fostering of career paths that value privacy/civil liberties expertise and
commitment. 371 People whose primary professional predilections lean
towards civil liberties have both personal and professional incentives to
make sure that commitment does not erode. Again, however, the classified
setting will make this more difficult than elsewhere. For example, bringing
in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common strategy for
Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment. 372 But for the
NSA civil liberties office, the top secret clearance process can take many
months, which puts sharp pressure on hiring managers to hire alreadycleared federal employees, not external advocates. Even if civil liberties
advocates get hired, they may well run into particularly lengthy clearance
investigation delays, based on prior associations, travel, and activities.
Office Director Becky Richards reports that five people she has so far
brought on board are from within the NSA, to minimize hiring delays (as
well as help her get a better understanding of how the NSA works). She has
so far hired just one privacy expert from outside the NSA. 373
Moreover, as I have explained generally about Offices of Goodness
staff, “even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff gain
experience within the government, that affiliation is likely to fade and their
reference group to shift to their more immediate peers.” 374 To oppose this
shift, an Office’s leader can consciously connect its staff to Goodness
advocates, for example, by sending them to conferences or other public or
private events. This works in two different ways. First, it reinforces Office
staff commitment to its assigned value simply by exposure and example. But
in addition, outside events can have a disciplining function, penalizing
370
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Office capture with harsh questions or criticisms, both public and private. As
Sallyanne Payton has written, “[s]tarch for the backbone of weak
professional groups generally must come from outside.” 375
Even if the new NSA civil liberties officer expends real attention to
situating herself and her staff in networks of privacy and civil liberties
advocates, harnessing those networks as reference groups will be difficult to
do. Intelligence law professional networks exist—there is a bar association
group 376 with conferences, newsletters, and continuing legal education
sessions 377; there are journals, 378 centers, 379 and like markers of professional
group-building. Yet none of these is quite on point. As I argued at length
above, the shared commitment of members of the national security bar is not
to strengthening civil liberties, but rather to technocratic expertise with
respect to the very complex legal rules at issue, and perhaps to a strong
national security state. At the conferences and in the newsletters, civil
liberties get remarkably little attention, although the role of lawyers receives
a bit more. 380 It is hard to imagine organizations like the ACLU, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, or the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
embracing full participation in their events by NSA staff. 381 Moreover, as
375
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always, secrecy makes everything more difficult. The new civil liberties
office’s staff will not be able to talk much about its work, and that makes
them less likely to have their feet held to the civil liberties fire at public
events.
A method for avoiding capture that is more promising would use the
new NSA civil liberties staff’s expectation about their own career paths. If
the possibility for career advancement exists chiefly in other NSA jobs, that
would be unhelpful; the prod to be a team player and not a constraint would
be unduly sharp. (On the other hand, if commitment could be maintained,
sending civil liberties/privacy staff back into the NSA’s operational offices
would be a way to seed civil liberties values across the agency.) It will be far
easier for the NSA civil liberties office staff to maintain their civil liberties
commitment if a sufficient number of national security jobs develop, both
within the new office itself and outside, in which demonstrated civil liberties
commitment is a prerequisite. Perhaps that will happen; the Snowden
disclosures and the natural maturation of this new bureaucratic strategy of
civil liberties offices mean that numerous government institutions are
gaining civil liberties staff. The PCLOB has a tiny staff, for example, and
may well grow. As discussed in the next section, the White House has
designated privacy/civil liberties staff. And of course, as the prior discussion
makes clear, there are already some such jobs scattered around the
government, at ODNI, DOJ, DHS, etc. For example, the new NSA civil
liberties officer came from a privacy compliance job at DHS. 382 There are,
as well, non-governmental opportunities, as well, at universities, advocacy
organizations, etc. The success of the new NSA office and other offices like
it may depend on whether this job network reaches critical mass; currently,
national security civil liberties jobs within the government are
extraordinarily scarce.
In short, to maximize the chances that the new NSA Civil Liberties
and Privacy Office will maintain both influence and commitment, the NSA
and other government officials should take the following steps:
•
•
•

Embrace a policy rather than a compliance role for the Office of
Civil Liberties and Privacy.
Foster relationships of Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy staff
with civil liberties offices elsewhere throughout the Intelligence
Community, with White House personnel, and with Congress.
Mandate civil liberties impact assessments that assess costs and
benefits of surveillance programs.
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Require periodic reporting by operational offices to the civil
liberties office of the security contribution made by each type of
surveillance authority.
Require the Office’s express comment on all proposed
operational changes that sweep in more data or data for more
people, particularly U.S. persons.
Use hiring and networking to encourage Office of Civil Liberties
and Privacy staff to consider civil liberties advocates as key
professional reference group.
Promote career paths for office staff that require demonstrated
civil liberties expertise and commitment.

B. Civil Liberties/Privacy Official(s) in the White House
From 1999 to 2001, the Clinton Administration Office of
Management and Budget had a political appointee “Chief Counselor for
Privacy.” Peter Swire, one of the members of the President’s Review Group,
served in that position, and the Review Group proposed that it be recreated,
with the fancier title of “Special Assistant to the President” and the added
authority that the appointee sit jointly in OMB and the National Security
Council staff, and chair a Chief Privacy Officer Council “to help coordinate
privacy policy throughout the Executive branch.” 383 The Review Group’s
report explained:
There are several reasons for creating this position: First, the
OMB-run clearance process is an efficient and effective way
to ensure that privacy issues are considered by policymakers.
Second, a political appointee is more likely to be effective
than a civil servant. Third, identifying a single, publicly
named official provides a focal point for outside experts,
advocacy groups, industry, foreign governments, and others
to inform the policy process. Fourth, this policy development
role is distinct from that of ensuring compliance by the
agencies. 384
Again, this is an Office of Goodness strategy seeking to foreground the
contested values of privacy/civil liberties, this time in inter-agency
processes. The President has agreed at least in part, directing designation of
one or more senior “Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Official[s]” on the
National Security Council staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and
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at the Office of Science and Technology Policy. 385 These officials were duly
designated in spring 2014. 386
The designation of White House civil liberties officials poses a risk:
it seems to me that it would be nearly impossible, bureaucratically, for an
agency’s civil liberties officer to sustain a position even a little bit to the left
of such officials on any issue with a high enough profile to receive White
House attention. Perhaps this risk is not too significant, at least in a
Democratic administration, when White House officials are unlikely to be to
an NSA officer’s right. After all, advocacy groups could complain
vociferously if they deem the persons chosen unsuitable. In addition, White
House officials are under less pressure to be collegial with agency staff, and
also can meet more comfortably with outsiders. There is, in fact, a new
committee bringing together advocacy organizations to meet with White
House officials and share their views and priorities. 387 Finally, the fact that
there are three such officials named might allow them to reinforce each
other’s commitments, even in the face of pushback by the operational
agencies. So the newly designated White House staffers may be able to
maintain civil liberties values in the policy debate at the White House,
countering the ever-present pressure to focus on the more limited realm of
law, compliance, and rights.
Assuming they are able to sustain both their own commitment and
influence, White House civil liberties staffers can also serve as key allies to
civil liberties officials within individual agencies, including the NSA. In
addition, while some inter-agency councils are not terribly effective, in this
situation, where part of what is needed is a secure reference group for a
contested value, inter-agency councils or committees might be quite
useful. 388 The point is to create a federal civil liberties bureaucracy that
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encourages its members to maintain their civil liberties commitment,
including by offering some career prospects for its members with backbone.
This proposal seems to me a useful piece of that strategy.
The President has not, however, committed to leaving these officials
in place. Their main assignment currently is overseeing the implementation
of PPD-28, which set a one-year deadline for the intelligence community
agencies to issue policies implementing its new approach: “our signals
intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be
treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever
they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in
the handling of their personal information.” 389 The three White House civil
liberties officials are marching the agencies towards that deadline, in January
2015.
But the White House needs people like these, officially assigned a
civil liberties role, permanently. Otherwise, as Morton Halperin, who served
on the National Security Council staff from 1994-1996 explains, civilliberties-minded staffers are apt to get shut out of national security policy
development processes. Halperin explains that he was able to bring a civil
liberties perspective into domestic national security policy debates on an
issue or two when he was specifically asked to do so, but not more
generally—his ordinary docket was foreign. 390 “The legitimacy of what you
put forward is based on being able to say, well that’s my role in the
bureaucracy,” Halperin says; “even someone [on the NSC staff] with those
instincts needs that mandate to participate.” 391 And at the White House, as
elsewhere, Halperin says, it has sometimes been thought that “the lawyers
are supposed to cover civil liberties.” But, really, “they don’t: they think of
their job as making a legal case for what the policy people want.” 392 So at
the White House as elsewhere, if a civil liberties perspective is desired, the
role of providing it needs to be assigned.
C. A Public Advocate in the FISA Court
Finally, it seems highly likely that in the near future, the FISA Court
will gain a new process for occasional appearance of a public or special
advocate. This proposal has been endorsed in varying forms by the Director
of National Intelligence, 393 the President’s Review Group, 394 the PCLOB, 395
chaired by the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer.”). The committee’s role has been
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and the President. 396 It was included in the recently-defeated Senate’s USA
FREEDOM Act bill, which will be one source for the next Congress’s work
on the issue. 397 Even former FISA presiding Judge John Bates, now the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, agrees in part.398
There is, however, substantial disagreement about details—and the details
matter.
The argument for such an advocate is straightforward: even if the
government exhibits exemplary candor as to facts, it cannot be relied upon to
brief against its own authority. Because the issues are complex and
important, they deserve full adversarial development in support of better
judicial decision-making. The arguments against are likewise easily
summarized: There’s not enough for a special advocate to do, since most
issues before the FISA Court are not legally complex, and the facts will not
be available to the advocate. Adversarial process will be slower and more
cumbersome without leading to better decision-making. Indeed, it might lead
to worse decision-making, because “adversarial process in run-of-the-mill,
fact-driven cases may erode” the government’s compliance with a
“heightened duty of candor to the Court.” 399 Indeed, “intelligence agencies
may become reluctant to voluntarily provide to the Court highly sensitive
information, or information detrimental to a case, because doing so would
also disclose that information to a permanent bureaucratic adversary.” 400
The consensus for some form of public advocate does not encompass
key details. The largest open question is about access. Under the House
version of the USA Freedom Act, FISA court public advocates could have
been excluded from factual or even legal presentations by the government to
FISA judges and their legal advisors. 401 The Senate version of the bill, by
contrast, specified that public advocates would receive “access to all relevant
legal precedent, and any application, certification, petition, motion, or such
other materials as are relevant to the duties of the special advocate.” 402 Judge
Bates, who served for six years as a FISA Court judge, has written several
letters to Congress, 403 purportedly on behalf of the judiciary, 404 opposing a
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full-time, autonomous special advocate in the FISA Court. Those letters
pointed out, as a disadvantage, that inclusion of adversarial process would
make the FISA Court more court-like. Judge Bates explained that “FISC
judges currently have substantial flexibility in deciding how best to receive
from the government information they consider relevant to a particular
case.” That flexibility, he suggested, could not survive inter partes
procedural requirements:
In order for the FISC to abide by the procedural and ethical
requirements that apply in adversarial proceedings, and for
the advocate to appear on equal footing with the applicant,
the FISC would have to ensure that the advocate was
involved in all such interactions in any case in which the
advocate may participate. . . .We expect that the logistical
challenges of administering such a three-way process for
more than a handful of cases would be considerable. 405
The Obama Administration, unfortunately, seems to be favoring limiting
access, as well: In a letter to Senator Pat Leahy about the Senate bill,
Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper opined that “the appointment of an amicus in selected cases…need
not interfere with…the process of ex parte [that is, one-party] consultation
between the Court and the government.” 406
In fact, the FISA court and the public would be best served by a more
empowered public advocate—one who is authorized to appear even without
invitation from the government or the court, and, still more important, who
is entitled to full access to information relevant to her duties. This would no
doubt alter the current one-party procedures before the FISA court. But
that’s a feature, not a bug. The FISA Court’s current procedures allow
meetings quite unlike ordinary judicial hearings, even ex parte ones. Inadvance advice from court staff to the government and iterative drafting are
common. The 2009 PowerPoint slide deck already described is similarly odd
for a judicial forum.” 407 Other practices such as an annual lunch bringing
together FISA Court judges and legal advisors (and the Chief Justice) with
the heads of the CIA, NSA, and FBI likewise encourage the judges to see
their own role as co-workers in the administration of the intelligence
community’s surveillance programs, supervising, for sure, but almost from
within. If a public advocate’s procedural rights disrupted this cozy
relationship, that would be all to the good. The salutary effect might be to
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reinforce the FISA judges’ role as arbiters of surveillance legality, not coworkers in the administration of the IC’s surveillance programs.
If designed properly, this variation of an Office of Goodness could be
essentially free from the ordinary threats to that kind of organization’s
influence and commitment. After all, the role of government-paid court
opponent is utterly familiar from the criminal justice system. Unlike
agencies, where staff must negotiate for a seat at decision-making tables,
most courts have firm inter partes norms requiring access for all parties. 408 If
Congress applies these norms to the FISA court, as it should,
implementation will be very familiar. As for capture, the analogous public
defenders certainly sometimes allow organizational or situational
imperatives to subvert their assigned courtroom role, 409 but there seems far
less reason to worry about capture in this litigation setting than inside of
agencies, at least if the public advocates are not otherwise beholden to the
agencies. If anything, the problem here might be too much single-minded
commitment, a strict preference for civil liberties over security—but of
course the court, which would remain the decider, is unlikely to become
unduly single-minded. I therefore see a FISA Court public advocate as a
variant on an Office of Goodness whose institutional setting would—if it is
well designed—shield it from many of the landmines that usually threaten
such an office’s influence or commitment.
Conclusion
The development of intelligence legalism has been a major and
salutary change in American governance over the past 35 years. Informed by
recent unprecedented disclosures, this Article has traced the institutional
arrangements that constitute the NSA’s compliance ecology. Rights
enunciation and compliance serve crucial rule-of-law values, and also
sometimes further civil liberties. And yet they are insufficient to ensure
appropriate civil liberties policy.
In his opinion for the Court last term, holding that the Fourth
Amendment forbids warrantless searches of cell phones, absent exigent
circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts poked some mild fun at internal
408
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government processes as sufficient safeguards of constitutional rights.
“[T]he Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government
agency protocols,” he wrote. But he continued, and I agree, that such
protocols are nonetheless “[p]robably a good idea.” 410 In this post-Snowden
moment, Congress can and should protect Americans’ privacy and civil
liberties by clamping down on bulk surveillance, creating legal rules that can
then be enforced by the courts and the intelligence community’s large
compliance bureaucracy. But Congress and the President should not be
limited by intelligence legalism. They should also follow the quite different
strategy of amplifying voices inside the surveillance state who will give
attention in internal deliberations and agency operations to civil liberties and
privacy interests. But institutional design is important; civil liberties offices
need deliberate and careful arrangements to safeguard their influence and
commitment. If civil liberties and privacy officials inside the NSA, at the
White House, and at the FISA Court can walk the tightrope of maintaining
both influence and commitment, they might well make a difference—both in
debates we now know about and others that remain secret. And they may
help create a document trail useful for public oversight, too.
Intelligence legalism has proven unequal to the task of opposing the
“collect everything” mindset. We need to add libertarian officials inside the
surveillance state to nurture its civil liberties ecology. If that ecology doesn’t
improve, the next big leak, in five or ten or twenty years, may reveal
invasions of Americans’ privacy that dwarf anything we have heard about so
far.
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